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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, which concerned a publisher’s right to use previously
published and printed copyrighted material in subsequent
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electronic media publications,1 has stirred publishers, authors, and
perhaps most frenetically their attorneys, to review and reassess
their standard publishing contracts.2 The question on everyone’s
minds is whether these agreements effectively provide for the use
and publication of copyrighted material in the new electronic
media formats—and if not, how can they be redrafted to comply
with Tasini?3 Contrary to the popular presumption, however,
Tasini does not pronounce upon the application of standard, print
media licensing terms to electronic uses of copyrighted material—
at least not directly. Indeed, the Supreme Court invalidated the
electronic media publications before it on extremely narrow
grounds, and went to great lengths to underscore that the scope of
the parties’ print media license agreements was not an issue before
the Court, and therefore was not a factor in its determinations as to
the legality of the electronic publications in question.4
In this regard, the Tasini decision is not atypical. Distilling
concrete and comprehensive directives from copyright/new
technology litigation disputes has never been easy. Indeed, the
development and proliferation of digital publishing technology has
led to a number of Tasini-type copyright controversies in recent
years, many of which have also resulted in very narrow holdings,
limited in their application to the larger copyright questions
presented in the digital information context.5 Interpreting and
1

533 U.S. 483, 487 (2001).
Cf. Robert H. Thornburg, The Presumption Against Implied Transfer of Electronic
Rights in Licenses Under Section 201(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act: A New Right for the
Bundle, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 235, 251 (2002) (“With the narrowing of
limitations on what constitutes revisions . . ., publishers must replace their traditional
handshake agreements with licenses specifically addressing electronic rights. While
publishers may wish to receive electronic rights currently known or later developed,
freelance authors typically seek to grant limited rights, to take advantage of new markets
that will develop in the future.” (citations omitted)).
3
Cf. Mark B. Radefeld, Note, The Medium Is the Message: Copyright Law Confronts
the Information Age in New York Times v. Tasini, 36 AKRON L. REV. 545, 577 n.177
(2003) (noting ways in which authors and publishers have included electronic rights
provisions in their agreements).
4
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499–502.
5
See generally e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (basing the denial of a preliminary injunction against the publisher of
“e-books” on the contract language between the authors and the original publisher), aff’d,
283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
2
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adapting copyright canons and license terms developed in
connection with traditional uses for copyrighted material, to
account for revolutionary technological advances, is an inevitably
incremental and iterative process.
Nonetheless, close examination of the pertinent copyright and
digital information cases reveals that the stilted progress toward a
comprehensive digital information copyright jurisprudence is only
partially due to the difficulties inherent in applying traditional
copyright mechanisms and policies to technologically advanced
uses for copyrighted works. Much of the jurisprudential lethargy
can also be attributed to the perennial failure of lawyers and other
participants in the publishing trade to harmonize their licensing
practices with the express mandates of the copyright statute.
For example, the lack of specific—and in some instances even
written—license terms and agreements in cases like Tasini, and the
factually parallel Greenberg v. National Geographic Society,6 has
germinated surrealistic interpretations of the copyright statute by
publishers seeking to bring their unauthorized electronic
publication activities within the law.7 Conceding that their
endeavors were not sanctioned by their informal and ambiguous
contractual arrangements, the publishers tried vainly to fit their
conduct within the “safe harbor” of the obscure § 201(c) of the
Copyright Act,8 which under very limited circumstances, allows
publishers to republish certain kinds of copyrighted works without
the author or copyright holder’s permission.9 Even in a case such
as Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, in which the rights of the
parties were governed by specific, written license agreements,10 the
dispositive clauses in those agreements were not cast in terms of
the express rights provided by the copyright statute. Instead, the
operative terms were expressed in ambiguous publishing trade
6

244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001).
Cf. Laurie A. Santelli, Comment, New Battles Between Freelance Authors and
Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v. New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 253, 297–98
(1998) (arguing that, under the copyright laws, publishers should not be able to reproduce
freelancers’ work without their consent).
8
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2003).
9
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2003) (discussing ownership of copyrights in collective
works).
10
150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 615–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
7
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lingo, which required extensive judicial deciphering in resolving
the dispute.11 Thus, efforts by the courts to apply and adapt the
body of existing copyright jurisprudence to electronic publication
disputes have been hampered by the failure of litigants to adhere to
the express provisions of the copyright law in arranging and
memorializing their copyright transactions.
In addition to the copyright conundrums innate to rapid
technological advancement, exacerbated by the persistently
obstruent licensing practices in the publishing trade, there is
another important factor that accounts for the lack of
comprehensive progress in digital information copyright
jurisprudence: the absence of any in-depth analysis of the fair use
doctrine in the relevant cases.12 Given the critical public interest in
the proliferation and use of digital technology as a whole, and in
electronic publication and dissemination of copyrighted works in
particular, fair use seems an appropriate course of expedition.
Notwithstanding the vital importance of balancing the competing
interests of authors, publishers, and the general public, however,
there has been little exploration of fair use as a social engineering
solution to the digital information/copyright conflict.
Consequently, much of the current electronic publishing legal
landscape remains an unsettled and uncertain frontier.
Ambiguities resulting from rapid technological advance and murky
licensing practices are unmitigated by publishers resorting to the
heretofore unexplored (and ultimately inapplicable) § 201(c) as the
primary digital re-publication defensive strategy.13 Admittedly,
however, the failure to reform licensing practices and litigation
strategies is only part of the problem. In a much larger sense,
electronic use and dissemination of printed copyrighted material
11

See id. at 621–22.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 499–502 (2001); Greenberg, 244 F.3d
at 1274–75; see generally Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613.
13
Cf. Michael Landau, The Importance of Electronic Rights Revisited, GigaLaw.com,
at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001-all/landau-2001-08-all.html (Aug. 2001)
(“Think of all of the excerpts of magazines or newspapers that are reprinted in books with
the legend ‘reprinted with the permission of Publisher X.’ Many of those may infringe,
even though permission had been obtained from the magazine or newspaper in which the
piece originally appeared, for the original publishers may not have had the right under
201(c) to have authorized reproduction.”).
12
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has yet to be independently assessed, not merely as a problem of
authors’ rights and publishers’ interests, but as a question of the
public interest and the principal policy objectives of the copyright
law.
This Article will offer a framework for the construction of a
more progressive and cohesive copyright jurisprudence in the
electronic publishing context, by attempting to address some of the
principal issues surrounding unauthorized digital re-publication of
printed copyrighted works. Part I will briefly summarize the
opinions in Tasini, Greenberg, and Random House, three of the
leading decisions that involve digital re-publication disputes. Part
I will highlight some of the ways in which these decisions
collectively delineate many of the salient issues regarding the
interface between the author’s exclusive property rights under the
copyright law and prevailing mechanisms for the commercial
exploitation and mass dissemination of copyrighted material in the
electronic media age.
Part II will begin the copyright policy analysis of digital republication by challenging a prevailing assumption that underlies
digital re-publication assessment and adjudication to date: namely,
that digital re-publication constitutes engagement in at least one or
more of the author’s exclusive rights under the copyright law. This
part will propose that while it is reasonable to approach digital republication as a simulation, incorporation, or combination of
various exclusive rights, it is also reasonable to approach digital republication as a wholly sui generis activity, one completely distinct
from any of its constituent, exclusive right elements. Accordingly,
the determination as to what property rights copyright holders
should have in connection with digital re-publication is one to be
made by Congress, with appropriate consideration given to the
concerns of all interested parties, particularly that of the general
public.
As an alternative to the analysis set forth in Part II, Part III will
accept the “digital re-publication as exclusive rights” premise that
underlies the leading decisions in this area. Accordingly, Part III
will attempt to lay a digital information jurisprudential framework
from this perspective, by addressing some of the principal issues
raised but left unresolved by these cases.
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For example, in Tasini and Greenberg, the defendant
publishers digitally re-published printed “collective works,” such
as newspapers and magazines, by, inter alia, disseminating them
through an electronic database without first obtaining permission
from the authors of the individual articles included in these
works.14 The ensuing litigations between the authors/copyright
holders and their publishers ultimately centered on § 201(c), which
grants the publisher of a collective work a special “privilege” to
publish subsequent revisions of such works, without the
permission of the contributing authors to the original publication.15
Relying upon § 201(c), the publishers sought to characterize their
digital re-publications as revisions of the original print
publications.16
The courts in both Tasini and Greenberg held that the digital
re-publications were not revisions with the meaning of § 201(c).17
There were two principal bases upon which the courts disqualified
the digital re-publications from shelter within the special statutory
privilege. First, the courts found that in undertaking the digital republications, the publishers made certain changes to the content of
the contributory articles and/or to each collective work overall,
which had the effect of rendering each digital re-publication an
entirely new publication or independent distribution of each of its
contributory articles, as opposed to an omnibus revision and republication of the collective work as a whole.18 Second, both
courts reasoned that such new independent distribution would have
a devastating impact upon the commercial market for further
publication of the individual contributory articles.19 In other
words, the courts determined that once the contributory articles
became electronically available, particularly online, no subsequent
publisher was likely to pay to publish any of these articles
elsewhere. Each of the foregoing results was held to be
inconsistent with the legislative purposes underlying § 201(c), and
14
15
16
17
18
19

See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488–89; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1269–71.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002).
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 492; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272.
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500–02; Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1275–76.
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500–02; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73.
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 n.6; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1274–75.
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therefore disqualified the digital versions of the printed collective
works from characterization as revisions under the statute.20
These rulings also raised but left unanswered the question of
whether content-unaltered, print-to-digital reproductions—that is,
full-image, exact digital replicas of printed collective works, with
no material added or removed—can qualify as revisions under §
201(c). Part III will address this question, and will contend that
full-image, exact digital replicas are also beyond the ambit of §
201(c).
There are at least two reasons why exact digital replicas of
printed collective works should not be considered § 201(c)
revisions. First, exact digital replicas are not revisions, at least not
in the ordinary sense of the term, in that nothing has been revised.
Second, exact digital replicas are also outside the narrower,
judicially construed parameters of the term revision as enunciated
in Tasini and Greenberg. These courts have held that the principal
purpose of § 201(c) is to preserve the market for subsequent
commercial exploitation of the individual contributory articles that
compose a collective work.21 Accordingly, just as the courts found
with respect to the content-altered, digital versions in Tasini and
Greenberg, full-image, exact digital replicas of collective works,
especially when dispersed into commercial online databases,
typically will undermine this objective as well, and thereby impede
the legislative intent underlying the statute. Thus, Part III will
conclude that § 201(c) is ultimately of little value in addressing the
substantive copyright issues presented in the digital re-publication
context.
Part IV will explore the fair use doctrine as an alternative
defense for unauthorized digital re-publication. An important
question implicated by the Tasini and Greenberg findings
regarding the negative commercial impact of unauthorized digital
re-publication is whether such negative impact forecloses the
defense of fair use. Without regard to whether the unauthorized
digital re-publication involves full-image, exact digital replicas, or
content-altered versions such as those at issue in Tasini and
20
21

See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 505–06; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73.
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73.
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Greenberg, the availability of fair use as an alternative defense is
implicated because the impact of an unauthorized use on the
commercial market for the subject copyrighted work—in this case,
each contributory article in the original collective work—is one of
the principal factors weighed in determining whether the
unauthorized use should be allowed as a fair use.22 Consequently,
the Tasini and Greenberg assessments regarding negative market
impact might seem to limit the availability of the fair use defense
in unauthorized digital re-publication cases.
While the findings regarding negative market impact in Tasini
and Greenberg appear portentous, it will be argued in Part IV that
they are not dispositive as to the availability of the fair use defense
in digital re-publication cases. In evaluating an unauthorized use
under the fair use doctrine, a court is obliged to evaluate four
separate factors, only one of which is the impact of the
unauthorized use on the commercial market for the copyrighted
work.23 Moreover, the purpose and significance of assessing
market impact under § 201(c), the primary impetus for the analyses
in Tasini and Greenberg, is not identical to that in evaluating
market impact under the fair use doctrine. In the context of
§ 201(c), it is primarily the limited re-publication interests of
commercial publishers that are pitted against the author’s exclusive
rights and interests in reaping the benefits from the commercial
exploitation of his or her work.24 In evaluating a claim of fair use,
however, it is the public interest in the broadest dissemination of
creative works that is weighed against the author’s interest in

22

See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Section 107 states:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.

Id.
23
24

See id.
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1275.
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obtaining a commercial return for his or her creative endeavors.25
Accordingly, a degree of negative market impact impermissible
under § 201(c) might nonetheless be an acceptable impingement
upon the author’s exclusive property rights as a matter of fair use.
Finally, Part V will explore the significance of Tasini,
Greenberg, Random House, and other decisions in developing
preemptive measures toward mitigating digital re-publication and
similar “new technological use” problems. Each of these cases
concerns the right of copyright holders to control electronic
publication of their works.26 Section 106 of the Copyright Act,
however, enumerates the specific uses of copyrighted material that
are exclusive to, and therefore can be controlled or restricted by,
the copyright holder.27 Section 201 sets forth the requirements for
the effective licensing and transfer of any, or any part of, the
copyright holder’s § 106 exclusive rights.28 Part V will contend
that Tasini, Greenberg, and Random House provide support for the
proposition that a license intended to authorize electronic or other
media uses of copyrighted material should not only specify the
subject media uses at issue, but should also satisfy §§ 106 and 201
by identifying the specific exclusive rights appurtenant to the
media activities being licensed. This is because the specification
of particular media uses alone will render the agreement
ambiguous as to the exclusive rights involved, thereby making it
difficult to assess the scope of the license with respect to new
technological uses developed during its term. By casting a
copyright license in terms of the exclusive rights, however,
ambiguities regarding the right to engage in a new technological
25

See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Section 107 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [providing authors’
rights in copyrighted works], the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright.

Id.
26

See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 491–92; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1270; Random House, Inc.
v. Rosetta Books, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2002).
27
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
28
See 17 U.S.C. § 201.
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use can be resolved directly in accordance with the provisions of
§§ 106 and/or 201, and the rights provided thereunder to copyright
holders.29
Part V will further contend that the judiciary can and should
encourage this exclusive rights emphasis in the drafting and
interpretation of copyright licenses and agreements. One means by
which this can be accomplished is through the application of a
presumption of “technological neutrality” in construing an
agreement that explicitly identifies the specific exclusive rights
that are the subject of the license conferred. Unless expressly
restricted by the terms of the agreement, either through language
specifically modifying or limiting the license of an exclusive right,
or through the inclusion of an appropriate, general reservation of
rights clause, an express license to engage in an exclusive right
should be presumed to extend to any and all technological means
available to engage in that right. This includes such methods that
were not in existence as of the time of the parties’ contracting, but
have come into being during the life of the parties’ agreement.
A presumption of technological neutrality is in accordance with
copyright policy, which encourages the development and
implementation of new technological uses for copyrighted
material. Moreover, consistent application of the presumption will
provide greater certainty in the interpretation and enforcement of
such contracts. Not only will it encourage parties to express their
publishing agreements in terms of the exclusive rights, but it will
also provide a concrete means by which to construe such
agreements in connection with new technological uses for
copyrighted material.
I. THE TASINI, GREENBERG, AND RANDOM HOUSE DECISIONS
Tasini,30 Greenberg,31 and Random House32 all concern the
relationship between the copyright holder’s exclusive property
29
30
31
32

See 17 U.S.C. § § 106, 201.
533 U.S. 483 (2001).
244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001).
150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
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rights under the Copyright Act and the unauthorized use of
copyrighted material in electronic media. The first two cases
concern whether the unauthorized digital re-publication33 of a
previously published collective work violates the copyrights of the
individual contributing authors to the work or is permissible under
the special revision privilege codified at 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).34
A. New York Times Co. v. Tasini
The plaintiffs in Tasini were all freelance writers who, pursuant
to varying publishing agreements, contributed articles to several
periodicals, including the New York Times, Newsday, and Sports
Illustrated.35 Some time after publishing the plaintiffs’ articles as
part of their regular print editions, the defendant publishers
provided the content therein to LEXIS/NEXIS (“NEXIS”) for
inclusion in its online, electronic text retrieval database.36 In
addition, the New York Times also provided its content to
University Microfilms International (“UMI”) in connection with
the production of two CD-ROM products, the New York Times
OnDisc (“NYTO CD”) and General Periodicals OnDisc (“GPO
CD”).37
The format in which the publishers provided their content to
NEXIS was electronic text versions of the articles that appeared in
their periodicals.38 The New York Times also provided such

33

The term “digital re-publication” is coined herein to distinguish unauthorized
electronic publication undertaken by, or at the behest of, the publisher of the original,
print publication of a copyrighted work, from wholly unauthorized, third-party electronic
publication, such as the uploading of copyrighted material onto the Internet by a private
individual. See generally Lateef Mtima, Trademarks, Copyrights and the Internet, in
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER
AND THE CORPORATE COUNSEL 387 (Apr. 2003) and the cases cited therein (applying
traditional intellectual property concepts, including re-publication and fair use, to the
Internet).
34
Random House does not involve interpretation of § 201(c), but rather concerns the
interpretation of standard, print media licensing terms in connection with digital republication. See infra Part I.C.
35
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488–89.
36
See id. at 489–90.
37
See id. at 490.
38
See id. at 489.
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material to UMI, for use in compiling the NYTO CD.39 Content
such as captions, headlines, and graphics, as well as the actual
publication layout such as text columns, was not included in the
electronic versions provided to NEXIS and UMI, and
consequently, was not reproduced in the NEXIS database or on the
NYTO CD.40
Using either NEXIS or the NYTO CD, a user could review the
entire electronic periodical content, or could retrieve the electronic
text of individual articles or of a group of individual articles in
response to an appropriate search.41 On the other hand, because
material such as photographs and column layouts had been deleted
from the electronic versions of the periodical content, the user
would not be able to review entire periodicals, or any of their
individual articles as they appeared in the original printed versions
of the collective works.42
The GPO CD, unlike the NEXIS database or the NYTO CD,
was an image-based product, which means that it contained fullimage, exact digital reproductions of the New York Times Book
Review and the New York Times Sunday Magazine.43 Accordingly,
the GPO CD reproduced both the New York Times Book Review
and the New York Times Sunday Magazine as each originally
appeared in hard copy.44 In addition, full-image, exact digital
reproductions of other periodicals were also included on the GPO
CD.45 Finally, just as with the NEXIS database and the NYTO
CD, when using the GPO CD a single article could be individually
retrieved, or retrieved as part of a group of articles, in response to a
search.46

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

See id. at 490–91.
See id. at 490.
See id. at 490–91, 499–501.
See id. at 490.
See id. at 491.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 491, 499–501.
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1. The Dispute Over the Use of the Freelance Writers’
Contributory Articles
The freelance writers argued that their agreements with the
publishers did not grant the publishers the right to publish the
authors’ works in electronic media formats, such as by including
the works in the foregoing databases and CD products.47 The
writers claimed that the electronic publications were unauthorized
and therefore violated several of their exclusive rights under the
copyright law.48
The publishers countered that, inter alia, because the works at
issue were collective works, they did not need the freelance
writers’ permission to re-publish them in electronic form.49 The
publishers relied upon § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which
permits publishers of collective works to publish revisions of such
works, without the permission of the individual contributing
authors:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work
is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole,
and [this distinct copyright] vests initially in the author of
the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of
[this distinct] copyright . . . the owner of copyright in the
collective work is presumed to have acquired only the
privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as
part of that particular collective work, any revision of that
collective work, and any later collective work in the same
series.50
Thus, the central issue in dispute became whether the
electronic re-publications constituted revisions within the special
statutory privilege.51
47

See id. at 491–92.
The copyright holder’s exclusive rights are enumerated at 17 U.S.C. § 106. Among
the exclusive rights at issue in Tasini were the rights of reproduction, distribution, and
public display. See infra Part II.
49
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499.
50
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002).
51
Both sides advanced several additional arguments in the lower court which were not
pressed before or ruled upon by the Supreme Court. The freelance writers argued that
even if the electronic publications fit within § 201(c), the publishers could not transfer
48
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2. Are Digital Re-Publications § 201(c) Revisions?
The freelance writers in Tasini challenged the publishers’
characterization of the digital re-publications as revisions with an
interpretation of the legislative intent underlying § 201.52
According to the writers, Congress’ primary purpose in passing
§ 201(c) was to abolish the doctrine of indivisibility.53 Under that
doctrine, once a contributory work was published as part of a
collective work, unless the publisher took affirmative steps to
secure a separate copyright for the author of the contribution, the
publisher obtained the sole copyright, both with respect to the
collective work as a whole and the individual contributory works
that composed the collective work.54
The freelance writers contended that Congress passed § 201(c)
in order to restore to authors the individual copyrights in their

their re-publication privilege to third-parties such as NEXIS and UMI. See Tasini v. N.Y.
Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and remanded, 206 F.3d 161
(2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). The writers further argued that even if the
privilege is transferable to third parties, it is limited to reproduction and distribution, and
does not include any privilege to display the individual articles, such as on a computer
screen. See id. at 816–18. As for the publishers, some of them did contend that the terms
of their license agreements extended to electronic publication. See id. at 810–12.
52
See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 809.
53
See id. at 815; 3-10 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, §§ 10.01, 10.02 (2002) (“Because the 1909 Act spoke of a single ‘copyright’
to which the author of a work was entitled, and referred in the singular to ‘the copyright
proprietor,’ it was inferred that the bundle of rights which accrued to a copyright owner
were ‘indivisible,’ that is, incapable of assignment in parts. This notion, which found its
historical roots in an early English copyright case and an American patent case, when
literally followed renders it impossible to ‘assign’ anything less than the totality of rights
commanded by copyright.” (footnotes omitted)).
54
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 494–95 (“Prior to the 1976 revision, . . .
authors risked losing their rights when they placed an article in a collective work. Pre1976 copyright law recognized a freelance author’s copyright in a published article only
when the article was printed with a copyright notice in the author’s name. When
publishers, exercising their superior bargaining power over authors, declined to print
notices in each contributor’s name, the author’s copyright was put in jeopardy. . . . Thus,
when a copyright notice appeared only in the publisher’s name, the author’s work would
fall into the public domain . . . [o]r . . . a court might find that an author had tacitly
transferred the entire copyright to the publisher . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 386 (1994); NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 53, §§ 10.01 [C][2], 10.02.
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contributions to collective works.55 Consequently, § 201(c)
preserves the contributing authors’ options with respect to further
publication of their works, beyond their authorization of the initial
publication in the collective work.56 At the same time, however,
§ 201(c) permits publishers to retain their autonomy in updating
their collective works as a whole, granting them the “privilege” to
publish appropriate revisions thereof, without having to obtain the

55

Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) provides that the copyright to a contributory work
resides in the contributing author, whereas the publisher obtains the copyright in the
collective work as a whole. See, e.g., James T. Ota, New York Times Co. v. Tasini: Can
Electronic Publications Ever Be Considered Revisions of Print Media?, 24 U. HAW. L.
REV. 843, 846 (2002) (“[U]nder 17 U.S.C. § 201, there are two copyrights vested in
[collective work] publications. The first copyright exists in the individual articles
themselves and usually vests in the original author of the work. The second copyright
exists in the publication as a whole and protects the publisher’s original expression in
selecting, coordinating, or arranging such articles to create the collective work.” (citations
omitted)).
56
See Christine Soares, Freelance Articles and Electronic Databases: Who Owns the
Copyrights?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0025 ¶ 9 (2001) (“The 1976 version of the
[Copyright] Act eliminated the notion of an indivisible copyright. Subsequently, separate
copyrights could be maintained for both the individual article and the collective work.
The author retained the copyright over the article, while the publisher maintained the
copyright for the collective work as well as a revision privilege detailed in §201(c) of the
statute.” (citations omitted)); Michael A. Albert & Ilan N. Barzilay, Copyright
Developments Affect Electronic Rights, 46 BOSTON B.J. 16 (Jan./Feb. 2002) (“In 1976,
Congress abolished the doctrine of copyright ‘indivisibility,’ providing instead that the
copyright owner’s bundle of exclusive rights ‘may be transferred . . . and owned
separately.’ Rights to an individual article in a collective work (reserved to the author)
were separated from rights to the article in the context of the collective work (reserved to
the publisher).” (citations omitted)); James K. Reed, Securing Electronic Rights in a
Post-Tasini World, in 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW, at 1080–81 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Handbook Series No. G0-00VJ,
2002) (“In the 1976 overhaul of the Copyright Act, Congress replaced the Doctrine of
Indivisibility with greater protections for writers. Specifically, Congress separated the
copyright in the individual contribution and the copyright in the collective work. The
contributed work and the collective work were now considered two different works, the
author of the contributed work remained the copyright owner of the contributed work and
the magazine publisher remained the copyright owner of the collective work. In addition,
Congress gave the publishers the ‘privilege’ to use the contributed work (a) as part of the
collective work, (b) in revisions of the collective work, and (c) in any later collective
work in the same series.” (citation omitted)); JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., COPYRIGHT LAW IN
BUSINESS AND PRACTICE § 4:23 (cumulative Supp. No. 1 2003).
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permission of each and every individual contributing author
thereto.57
Both the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed
with the freelance writers that Congress’ primary objective in
revising § 201 was to benefit authors by abolishing the doctrine of
indivisibility.58 The two courts differed, however, as to the
application of the legislative imperative to the facts of the case.
The district court reasoned that the publisher’s collective work
copyright and its concomitant revision privilege are both
substantively grounded in the publisher’s creative editorial
contribution in arranging the collective work as a whole.59 Thus,
although the publisher is not permitted to use the contributory
works in an entirely new collective work publication,60 the district
court held that § 201(c) authorizes their use in a subsequent
revision that reflects the publisher’s creative editorial contributions
in arranging the original work.61 Finding that the electronic
57

See Albert & Barzilay, supra note 56, at 16 (“Publishers could thus reprint, revise or
transfer their publications to different media, or archive them in bound volumes or
microfilm; and these ‘revisions’ would not infringe the copyrights belonging to the author
of each included article. Publishers did not have to negotiate separately with each author
in order to be able to archive or reprint the entire collective work.”).
58
See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 819–20 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and
remanded, 206 F.3d 161, 167–68 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
59
See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 820–21 (“In other words, the creators of collective works
are entitled to rights in [the contributory] works only to the extent that they have
demonstrated creativity in selecting and arranging preexisting materials into an original
collective whole. It is this original contribution which gives a collective work its unique
character, i.e., which makes it identifiable as ‘that collective work.’” (citation omitted)).
60
See id. at 821 (“Defendants are not permitted to place plaintiffs’ articles into ‘new
anthologies’ or ‘entirely different magazine[s] or other collective work[s],’ but only into
revisions of those collective works in which plaintiffs’ articles first appeared. If
defendants change the original selection and arrangement of their newspapers or
magazines, however, they are at risk of creating new works, works no longer
recognizable as versions of the periodicals that are the source of their rights. Thus, in
whatever ways they change their collective works, defendants must preserve some
significant original aspect of those works . . . if they expect to satisfy the requirements of
[§] 201(c).” (citation omitted)).
61
See id. at 820 (“Although the ‘any revision’ language of [§] 201(c) is broad, a new
work must be recognizable as a version of a preexisting collective work if it is to be fairly
characterized a revision of ‘that collective work.’ . . . [C]ollective works, even to the
extent that they consist entirely of individual original contributions, possess
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publications in fact retained this contribution in that, inter alia,
they continued to reflect the publishers’ initial decision to select
these specific articles for inclusion in the original work, the district
court concluded that the digital re-publications constituted
revisions within the meaning of § 201(c).62
The Court of Appeals, however, did not agree that the
electronic publications sufficiently reflected the publishers’
original editorial contributions so as to qualify as revisions of the
original collective works.
Instead, the Court of Appeals
emphasized the fact that in the electronic transfer of the
periodicals’ content “a substantial portion of what appears in that
particular [collective work] is not made part of [the] file
transmitted . . . including . . . formatting decisions, pictures, maps
and tables, and obituaries.”63 The court found that the deletion of
this material diluted the publisher’s original editorial contribution
to the point that it was no longer sufficiently recognizable in the
final electronic products.64
Moreover, the court also noted that in the digital formats, the
authors’ contributions could be retrieved individually, just as if the
individual articles had been sold or licensed one at a time, then
combined with the contents of other collective works, and finally,
compiled into an entirely new work.65 The individual redistribution of contributory works, or the use of such works in new
collective works are beyond the § 201(c) privilege and
accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the court held that the

distinguishing original characteristics of their own—i.e., they are greater than the sum of
their parts. It is therefore possible to revise a collective work by changing the original
whole of that work without altering the content of the individual contributions to that
work.” (citations omitted)).
62
See id. at 821–24. As such, the court concluded that the digital re-publications did
not deprive the freelance writers of any secondary publication market which Congress
had intended them to have. See id. at 826–28. The court also concluded that the
publisher’s privilege to publish revisions is not only transferable to third parties, but that
it includes the right to display the collective work and any revision thereof. See id. at
815–17.
63
Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 1999).
64
See id. at 168–69.
65
See id. at 169–70.
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unauthorized digital re-publications infringed upon the authors’
copyrights.66
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court agreed with both lower courts that the
1976 revision of § 201 was primarily intended to benefit authors
by disposing of the doctrine of indivisibility.67 Consequently,
authors of contributions to collective works are free to exploit their
works in subsequent venues, and the publisher of the collective
work has no right to make any further use of such contributory
works, other than its “privilege” to publish a revision of the entire
collective work in accordance with § 201(c).68
In deciding whether the electronic publications in fact
constituted revisions within the meaning of § 201(c), however, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit that in the subject
digital formats, the collective works were effectively disassembled
into new and independent publications of the contributory articles
that made up the original collective works:
In agreement with the Second Circuit, we hold that
§ 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue here. The
publishers are not sheltered by § 201(c), we conclude,
because the databases reproduce and distribute articles
standing alone and not in context, not ‘as part of that
particular collective work’ to which the author contributed,
66

See id.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 (2001). The Court held that in
passing § 201, Congress intended to clarify that the publisher’s copyright in a collective
work is limited to the collective work as a whole, and is based upon the editorial
selection, arrangement, and layout of the work. See id. at 495–96. Revised § 201(c)
enables the author contributing to the collective work to retain his or her copyright in his
or her own creative contribution—that is, his or her individual article. See id. But see
Andrew Snyder, Comment, Pulling the Plug: Ignoring the Rights of the Public in
Interpreting Copyright Law, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 365, 374–75 (2002) (“The majority
failed to recognize the intent of the authors and publishers (and Congress) with regard to
201(c). This important consideration shows authors were concerned about the possibility
of publishers altering the content of articles, and not about how or where the articles were
displayed. . . . Thus, at the time of the statute’s creation, the conflict surrounding 201(c)
dealt with changing the content, not with altering the presentation of text in different
formats.” (citations omitted)).
68
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 496–97.
67
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‘as part of . . . any revision’ thereof, or ‘as part of . . . any
later collective work in the same series.’ Both the print
publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, have
infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors.69
Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that to allow the digital
re-publications as privileged revisions would defeat the legislative
objective underlying § 20l(c).70 In effect, the Court found that the
development of digital technology has resulted in the creation of a
secondary, “stand-alone” market for the individual contributions to
collective works and construed that Congress intended that the
contributory authors, as opposed to the publishers, be the ones to
benefit from such new markets.71 Given the nature of the
electronic products at issue, the Court found that there is no
69

Id. at 488; see also Soares, supra note 56, ¶ 15 nn.41–42 (“[T]he Court determined
that the search-and-retrieve method of accessing the articles in the databases made it
impossible to consider the databases as revisions of the original periodicals. The majority
viewed the databases either as new collective works or simply as a means by which
individual articles could be retrieved.” (citations omitted)).
70
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 n.6 (“In years past, books compiling stories by journalists
such as Janet Flanner and Ernie Pyle might have sold less well had the individual articles
been freely and permanently available on line. In the present, print collections of
reviews, commentaries, and reportage may prove less popular because of the Databases.
The Register of Copyrights reports that ‘freelance authors have experienced significant
economic loss’ due to a ‘digital revolution that has given publishers [new] opportunities
to exploit authors’ works.’”); see also Alicia Morris Groos, Developments in U.S.
Copyright Law 2000–2001: From Revising the Old South to Redefining the Digital
Millennium, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 130 (2001) (“With the evolution of digital
technology, the Internet, and massive searchable databases such as NEXIS and
WESTLAW, selling and marketing individual stand-alone copies of articles on a wide
scale became economically feasible for the first time. For a fee, publishers license copies
of their collective works (containing individual articles) to these databases, and the
database publishers then allow their paying users to search for, retrieve, download, and
print copies of the individual articles. The copyright owner of the individual work is left
out of the equation, except for facing a ‘shrunken market for secondary sales of their
works.’” (citation omitted)).
71
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497. Although the district court differed on the issue of who
should benefit from such new markets, all three courts seem to assume the existence of
secondary, “stand alone” digital re-publication markets for individual contributory works.
See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 826 (“The [district] [c]ourt does not take
lightly that its holding deprives plaintiffs of certain important economic benefits
associated with their creations.”), rev’d and remanded, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999),
aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). A reasonable argument can be made, however, challenging
whether such secondary markets actually exist. See infra Part IV.
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practical difference between licensing the contributions to a
database individually or as a part of the collective work as a
whole,72 and thus the secondary, “stand-alone” re-publication
market that § 201(c) restores to individual contributing authors had
been usurped by the publishers.73 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the digital re-publications were not revisions within
the meaning of § 201(c), but rather constituted new publications of
the contributory works beyond the statutory privilege.74
72

See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499–500 (“[T]he three Databases present articles to users
clear of the content provided either by the original periodical editions or by any revision
of those editions. The Databases first prompt users to search the universe of their
contents: thousands or millions of files containing individual articles from thousands of
collective works . . ., either in one series (the Times, in NYTO) or in scores of series (the
sundry titles in NEXIS and GPO). When the user conducts a search, each article appears
as a separate item within the search result. . . . In either circumstance, we cannot see how
the Database perceptively reproduces and distributes the article ‘as part of’ either the
original edition or a ‘revision’ of that edition.”).
73
See id. at 497 (“Essentially, § 201(c) adjusts a publisher’s copyright in its collective
work to accommodate a freelancer’s copyright in her contribution. . . . It would scarcely
‘preserve the author’s copyright in a contribution’ as contemplated by Congress if a
newspaper or magazine publisher were permitted to reproduce or distribute copies of the
author’s contribution in isolation or within new collective works.” (citations omitted)).
74
Citing the doctrine of media neutrality, Justice Stevens vigorously challenged this
conclusion in his dissenting opinion. See id. at 512–15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As
Justice Stevens argued, the attributes of independent retrieval are characteristics inherent
to digital media, and to disqualify the digital re-publications as revisions on that basis is
to discriminate against electronic media in favor of print media. Cf. 1 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 20.2, at 94 (1976) (“[T]he mere
reproduction of a work of art in a different medium should not constitute the required
originality, for the reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any
particular medium.”); CRC Press, LLC v. Wolfram Research, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 500,
509-10 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (“Changing the medium in which a copyrightable work is
displayed is not a sufficient change to give rise to a derivative work. . . . By moving the
content of [a copyrightable] website to [a written encyclopedia], . . . [p]laintiff could not
have created a copyrightable derivative work.” (citations omitted)); L. Batlin & Son, Inc.
v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976). Justice Stevens’ arguments are particularly
convincing with respect to the disqualification of The New York Times’ full-image GPO
CD. While the removal of photographs, captions, and graphics in connection with the
other digital re-publications contributed to their characterization as entirely new and
independent publications, the only differences between the GPO CD and the original
print versions is that the GPO CD is Boolean searchable and combines previously
independent editions with other periodicals on a single CD. Arguably, the majority
eschewed a direct conflict with the doctrine of media neutrality, because the compilation
of originally independent editions onto a single disc is not a feature “inherent” to digital
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Finally, the Supreme Court noted that the defendants offered
no other arguments in defense of their electronic activities.75
Against the Authors’ charge of infringement, the Publishers do
not here contend the Authors entered into an agreement
authorizing reproduction of the Articles in the Databases. Nor do
they assert that the copies in the Databases represent “fair use” of
the Authors’ Articles. Instead, the Publishers rest entirely on the
privilege described in § 201(c).76
In the absence of any claim of license to engage in the digital
re-publications, or the assertion of a copyright defense such as fair
use,77 once the Court found § 201(c) inapplicable, it held that the
unauthorized publications were undertaken in violation of the
authors’ contributory work copyrights.78
B. Greenberg v. National Geographic Society
A publisher’s use of a printed contributory work in a
subsequent digital re-publication was also the basis for litigation in
Greenberg v. National Geographic Society.79 In Greenberg, the
freelance photographer of a copyrighted photograph brought suit
media. As discussed in Part II, however, if the GPO CDs were limited to a single edition
per disc, Justice Stevens’ argument seems inescapably cogent.
75
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499.
76
Id. Although Newsday and Time had contended before the district court that their
publishing agreements with the freelance writers actually authorized electronic
publication, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals had disposed of Time’s
argument on the merits, and had further ruled that Newsday had ultimately waived this
defense. See id. at 489 n.1. Neither defendant renewed these arguments before the
Supreme Court, nor did any of the publishers seek to defend the electronic publications
on any grounds other than the assertion of their privilege to undertake revisions under §
201(c). See id.
77
As discussed in Part III, the publishers may have had a viable fair use defense.
78
See id. at 506.
79
Another important case in which the defendant sought to rely upon § 201(c) in
defense of an unauthorized use of previously published copyrighted works is Ryan v.
CARL Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1998). However, that case does not actually
involve digital re-publication, in that the defendant was not the publisher of the subject
works, but rather, provided something like a document delivery service. See id. at 1147.
Defendant maintained a database comprising the titles of published articles, and once a
user/client indicated a selection therefrom, defendant would physically visit a library that
contained a copy of the article, photocopy it, and then send a copy to the user/client. See
id.
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against his publisher, the National Geographic Society (“National
Geographic”), when National Geographic re-used his photograph
in the production of an image-based, CD-ROM replica of all 1,200
back issues of National Geographic Magazine (“NG-CD”).80 In
addition to the exact digital reproduction of the back issues
(“Replica”), the NG-CD also contained an opening animation
sequence (“Animation Sequence”), which had been constructed
from photographs that had appeared on various covers of the
magazine, including plaintiff Greenberg’s photograph.81 Finally,
the NG-CD also contained a software program that enabled, inter
alia, retrieval of independent back issues and/or the individual
articles from within each back issue.82
Just as the defendant publishers in Tasini, National Geographic
relied upon § 201(c) in defense of its digital re-publication,
contending that the NG-CD was merely a revision of its entire
archive of collective work back issues.83 The Eleventh Circuit
concluded, however, that the use of the contributory work in the
Animation Sequence went well beyond any reasonable definition
of the term revision:
The Society argues that its use . . . constitutes a “revision”
of [its] “. . . collective work”, referring to the [NG-CD] as
the compendium of over 1,200 independent back
issues . . . . Assuming arguendo, but expressly not
deciding, that 201(c)’s revision privilege embraces the
80

See Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“What the user of the [NG-CD] sees on his computer screen, . . . is a reproduction of
each page of the Magazine that differs from the original only in the size and resolution of
the photographs and text. Every cover, article, advertisement, and photograph appears as
it did in the original paper copy of the Magazine. The user can print out the image of any
page of the Magazine, but the [NG-CD] does not provide a means for the user to separate
the photographs from the text or otherwise to edit the pages in any way.”).
81
See id. (“The Sequence is an animated clip that plays automatically when any disc
from the [NG-CD] library is activated. The clip begins with the image of an actual cover
of a past issue of the Magazine. This image, through the use of computer animation,
overlappingly fades . . . into the image of another cover . . . and then morphs into another
cover image, and so on, until 10 different covers have been displayed. . . . The entire
sequence lasts for 25 seconds, and is accompanied by music and sound effects.”).
82
See id.
83
See id. at 1271–72. National Geographic also pursued a fair use defense, the
disposition of which is discussed in Part IV.
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entirety of the [reproduced 1,200 back issues], we are
unable to stretch the phrase “that particular collective
work” to encompass the [Animated] Sequence and [the
software] Program elements as well.84
The court concluded that the Animation Sequence was an
entirely new work, independent of the printed collective work in
which Greenberg’s photograph had originally appeared.85
In layman’s terms, the instant product is in no sense a
“revision.” In this case we do not need to consult
dictionaries or colloquial meanings to understand what is
permitted under § 201(c).
....
. . . [C]ommon-sense copyright analysis compels the
conclusion that [National Geographic] . . . has created a
new product (“an original work of authorship”), in a new
medium, for a new market that far transcends any privilege
of revision or other mere reproduction envisioned in
§ 201(c).86
C. Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books
Unlike the Tasini and Greenberg cases, Random House, Inc. v.
Rosetta Books did not involve the § 201(c) revision privilege in as
much as that dispute did not involve collective works.87 Rather,
the extent to which publishing and licensing terms, which had been
drafted in contemplation of print publication, could be
subsequently construed to authorize electronic publication was the
principal issue in controversy.88 Ironically, however, the plaintiff
publisher in this case was not seeking to deploy its publishing
license in order to undertake electronic publication, but rather to
enjoin it.89
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 1272.
See id. at 1272–73.
Id.
150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 613–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
See id. at 617–18.
See id. at 614.
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In Random House, three well-known authors—William Styron,
Kurt Vonnegut, and Robert B. Parker—had each entered into
separate agreements with Random House to publish certain of their
works.90 While the terms of the individual agreements differed in
various respects, each agreement granted Random House the
exclusive right to “print, publish and sell the work in book form.”91
In 2000 and 2001, each of the authors entered into separate
agreements with the defendant Rosetta Books, permitting Rosetta
to publish certain of their works as “e-books.”92 These works were
also the subject of the authors’ prior individual agreements with
Random House.93 Upon learning of the Rosetta agreements,
Random House commenced litigation alleging, inter alia,
copyright infringement and sought to enjoin publication of the ebooks.94 Random House contended that the publication of the ebooks would infringe upon the grants of copyrights that it had
previously obtained under its agreements with each of the
authors.95 In short, Random House took the position that its right
“to publish in book form” encompassed the right to publish the
works in electronic book form, and consequently, the Rosetta
agreements infringed upon the copyrights that Random House had
already obtained from the authors.96
90

The Styron agreement was entered into in 1961, the Vonnegut agreement in 1967,
and the Parker agreement in 1982. See id. at 615–16.
91
Id. at 615.
92
See id. at 614–15 (“Ebooks are ‘digital books[s] that you can read on a computer
screen or an electronic device.’ Ebooks are created by converting digitized text into a
format readable by computer software. The text can be viewed on a desktop or laptop
computer, personal digital assistant or handheld dedicated ebook reading device. . . .
Although the text of the ebook is exactly the same as the text of the original work, the
ebook contains various features that take advantage of its digital format. For example,
ebook users can search the work electronically to find specific words and phrases. They
can electronically ‘highlight’ and ‘bookmark’ certain text, which can then be
automatically indexed and accessed through hyperlinks. They can use hyperlinks in the
table of contents to jump to specific chapters. . . . In addition, users can have displayed
the definition of any word in the text. In one version of the software, the word can be
pronounced aloud.” (citations omitted)); see also Nancy B. Vermylen, Book Publishing in
the Age of the E-Book, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 190, 193 (2002) (explaining various
versions of e-books and readers available).
93
See Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 615–17.
94
See id. at 614.
95
See id.
96
See id. at 620–21.
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In interpreting the prior agreements between Random House
and each of the individual authors—some of which were executed
more than forty years prior to the Rosetta agreements—the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
contracts simply did not contemplate electronic publication.97
Although the court readily acknowledged that it was possible for a
copyright holder to license the right to use his or her work through
technological means not in existence as of the time of the parties’
contracting,98 the court found that the express language of the
parties’ agreement indicated that the Random House license did
not extend to the new technological application of e-books:
[T]his [c]ourt finds that the most reasonable interpretation
of the grant in the contracts at issue to “print, publish and
sell the work in book form” does not include the right to
publish the work as an ebook. . . . The Random House
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines a “book” as “a
written or printed work of fiction or nonfiction, usually on
sheets of paper fastened or bound together within
covers” . . . .
[Moreover, in the contract] separate grant language is used
to convey the rights to publish book club editions, reprint
editions, abridged forms, and editions in Braille. This
language would not be necessary if the phrase “in book
form” encompassed all types of books.99
Accordingly, the court’s decision did not turn upon a
determination as to which of the authors’ exclusive rights under the
copyright law had been assigned to Random House as part of the
overall grant of the right “to print, publish and sell.”100 Instead,
disposition of the dispute turned upon interpretation of the
97

See id. at 621–22 (holding that “in book form” does not apply to e-books).
See id. at 619; see also generally Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt
Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[I]f the broad terms of the license are
more reasonably read to include the particular future technology in question, then the
licensee may rely on that language.”); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d
150 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that the agreement at issue covered the “new use” of
converting the copyrighted motion picture for television use).
99
Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
100
See id.
98
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publishing trade term “in book form.”101 Once the court found that
an e-book does not constitute the production of a printed work “in
book form,” the grant of rights under the Rosetta agreements
became distinct from the grant of rights under the Random House
license, and there was no basis for plaintiff’s infringement
claim.102
D. The Right of Digital Re-Publication: To Whom Does It
Belong?
Tasini, Greenberg, and Random House each involve the
problem of determining who has the right to re-publish printed
copyrighted material in electronic formats.103 Although the parties
and even the courts in each of these cases apparently presumed that
right belongs at least initially to the copyright holder, as one might
expect, the copyright statute does not expressly refer to such a right
in its enumeration of an author’s exclusive property rights, much
less designate to whom such a right belongs. In order to
understand the basis for the presumption that the digital republication right belongs to the copyright holder—and more
importantly, to test the validity of that presumption—it is
necessary to review briefly the scheme of rights provided for under
the copyright law.

101

Although it is easy to perceive how that phrase could be understood to mean “the
production of anything that resembles a book,” in the publishing trade, “in book form”
has generally been construed to encompass only conventional books. Consequently
publications such as comic books have been excluded from the definition. See, e.g., Field
v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); NIMMER, supra note 53, §
10.14 [C]. As discussed previously, reconciling publishing trade terminology with the
express provisions of the copyright statute, regardless of whether any new technological
use is involved, is the basis for much publishing license litigation.
102
See Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 624; see also CRC Press, LLC v. Wolfram
Research, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 500, 506–10 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (discussing whether
language assigning all rights to a work includes an assignment of the right to undertake
derivative works).
103
See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Greenberg v. Nat’l
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001); Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613.
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II. DIGITAL RE-PUBLICATION AND THE COPYRIGHT LAW
Congressional authority to enact a copyright law is expressly
provided for in the Constitution.104 Pursuant to article I, Congress
has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive
Right
to
their
respective
Writings
and
105
Discoveries . . . .”
In accordance with this constitutional
mandate, both Congress and the courts have determined that the
“overarching object of copyright law in the United States is to
encourage the widest possible production and dissemination of
literary and artistic works.”106 Through widespread production and
104

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.; see also Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 581 (1985) (“Congress has interpreted the
term ‘writings’ generously when fulfilling its constitutional mandate. The first copyright
statute, of 1790, listed maps and charts ahead of books in its short list of protected
‘writings.’ In the 1976 thorough revision of copyright law, the constitutional protection
of ‘writings’ became a protection that ‘subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.’ This language insures that copyright is receptive to new
technologies, provided that fixation and communication are possible.” (citations
omitted)); Jason S. Rooks, Note, Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory
Licenses in Copyright Infringement Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 257 (1995)
(detailing the derivation of American copyright law from Great Britain’s Statute of Anne,
and discussing the establishment of a public domain in creative works).
106
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.14 (2d ed. 2002); see also Marci A. Hamilton,
Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of Deference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 317, 319 (2000) (“Elements of the [Supreme C]ourt’s . . . interpretation of the
Copyright Clause . . . includ[e] an emphasis on the public good that forces author’s rights
to be conditioned by the public. . . . From the first case, through the present, the Court has
treated copyright law as positive law, the parameters of which are determined by
Congress ([as] limited by the Constitution’s strictures).”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990) (“The Supreme Court has often and
consistently summarized the objectives of copyright law. The copyright is not an
inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their
creations. It is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the
intellectual enrichment of the public.”); Rooks, supra note 105, at 259 (“The Supreme
Court . . . has made clear that . . . copyright exists primarily to serve the public interest;
authors’ and publishers’ interests are therefore secondary.”). But see Alfred C. Yen,
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright As Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517,
531 (1990) (“Even though economics became the ostensibly sole basis of copyright,
modern copyright somehow evolved along lines similar to those suggested by the natural
law. This can be seen most clearly by outlining the basic copyright doctrines of
105
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dissemination, the greatest amount of creative works are likely to
reach the largest audience, who will not only benefit from
exposure to these works, but who will in turn build upon the ideas
advanced therein and produce additional works. Thus, the
progress of the arts and sciences is furthered and assured to the
greater societal good.107
In order to achieve such widespread dissemination of creative
works, however, there must first be an abundant supply of creative
works to disseminate.108 Consequently, creative artists must have
proper incentive to produce these works.109 As set forth in article
I, Congress may provide such incentive by granting authors the

originality and the idea/expression dichotomy and then comparing them to the natural law
of property through labor and possession . . . . [M]odern American copyright appears to
vindicate an author’s right to property in the fruits of her labor, but subject to the limits of
what can be feasibly possessed.”).
107
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Leval, supra note 106, at 1126 (“Copyright
seeks to maximize the creation and publication of socially useful material. . . . Copyright
is not a reward for goodness but a protection for the profits of activity that is useful to the
public education.”); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and “The Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41–42 (1993) (“One’s conclusion as to the nature of copyright is
determined by one’s view of its source. A coherent and consistent view of copyright
requires that the source be Congress, which can grant the author only the right to publish
and vend, with only such extensions as do not subordinate constitutional policies to the
cause of private profit. The point is that copyright law is more regulatory than
proprietary in nature, for only the regulatory concept makes any sense in view of the
three policies that the Copyright Clause mandates: promotion of learning, protection of
the public domain, and benefit to the author.”).
108
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
109
See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 299,
330 (1988) (“Locke offers a positive justification for property that buttresses his labor
theory. He suggests that granting people property rights in goods procured through their
labor ‘increase[s] the common stock of mankind,’ a utilitarian argument grounded in
increasing mankind’s collective wealth. . . . Like [Locke’s] labor theory, [Hegel’s]
personality theory has intuitive appeal when applied to intellectual property: an idea
belongs to its creator because the idea is a manifestation of the creator’s personality or
self.”); Scott L. Bach, Note, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory Licenses:
Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 396–97 (1986) (“The
framers of the Constitution concluded that the most effective way to encourage creative
expression is to give exclusive rights to authors for a period of limited duration. Such
rights, however, are not Constitutionally guaranteed, but are created in Congress’s
discretion.” (citations omitted)).
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“exclusive right” to their works.110 By securing to authors
property rights in connection with their works, the copyright law
provides a means by which authors might profit financially from
their efforts and thereby provides them with the necessary
inducement to undertake and continue their creative labors.111
The specific mechanism through which the Copyright Act
provides an author with exclusive property rights might seem
complex at first, but it is actually relatively straightforward. Under
the copyright law, the uses to which a copyrighted work might be
put—such as reading a book, distributing a photograph for sale, or
performing a musical composition—are divided into two
categories. The first category is comprised of a list of specific uses
that are designated as exclusive to authors and are referred to as the
110

See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“‘The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
“Science and useful Arts.”‘“ (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))); see
generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, §
8.01[A]; Bach, supra note 109, at 383 (“The limited monopoly policy of copyright law
arises from . . . the Constitution . . . . Underlying the [copyright clause] is the principle
that society will be harmed if artists are not given exclusive rights to exploit their works
for a limited time, because the lack of such rights would discourage artistic creativity.
Thus, granting a limited monopoly in copyright advances the public interest because it
encourages artists to create through the prospect of financial gain. The eventual
termination of the monopoly assures the public good, because it allows the assimilation
of artistic works into society, which is the ultimate objective of copyright law.” (citations
omitted)); Rooks, supra note 105, at 257 (“Read literally, three fundamental policies are
advanced by the [copyright] clause: (1) to promote learning . . .; (2) to benefit
authors . . .; and (3) to ensure public access . . . . Of these three policies, two benefit the
public and one the author; and the benefit to the author is a means to the ends of
promoting learning and protecting the public domain.”); Hughes, supra note 109, at 291
(“Intellectual property is often the propertization of what we call ‘talent.’”).
111
See Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair
Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 143, 158–59 (1993)
(“Copyright law vests a bundle of rights in the creator of certain kinds of intellectual
property. . . . Copyright law, both ancient and modern, is founded on the fundamental,
though perhaps implicit, notion that adverse economic incentives are created if
unrestricted [use] of intellectual products is permitted. When adverse incentives exist,
society will not have as much creative innovation as it wishes to encourage. Therefore,
the emphasis of copyright law is on the benefits derived by the public from the creative
efforts of authors. Reward to copyright owners or authors is a necessary but secondary
consideration.” (citations omitted)); cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 14.03
(discussing the copyright owner’s remedies with respect to the infringer’s profits).
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author’s “exclusive rights.”112 The second category comprises all
uses not in the first category; these uses remain freely available to
the general public.113
Under this system, if someone wishes to use a copyrighted
work in one of the ways designated as an exclusive right—for
example, if one wishes to copy or distribute the work—that person
must first obtain the permission of the author of the work.114
When so inclined, the author typically bestows his or her
permission in the form of a license, which is granted for a fee.115
Consequently, through the mechanism of exclusive rights, the

112

See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 2.18; I. Fred Koenigsberg,
Copyrights, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 2002, at 142–44 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G0-010T,
2002); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14.2.3 (“Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act
prescribes five exclusive rights in copyrighted works: the rights to reproduce, to
distribute, to perform, to display and to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work. Taken together these rights reflect Congress’ balanced judgment
about the uses that a copyright owner must be able to prohibit in order to appropriate the
value of its work through sales or licenses in the market place and about those uses that,
in the interests of public access, must not be fettered by copyright.” (footnotes omitted)).
113
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 393–94 (1968)
(“The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control over all uses of his
copyrighted work. Instead, § 1 of the Act enumerates several ‘rights’ that are made
‘exclusive’ to the holder of the copyright. If a person, without authorization from the
copyright holder, puts a copyrighted work to a use within the scope of one of these
‘exclusive rights,’ he infringes the copyright. If he puts the work to a use not enumerated
in § 1, he does not infringe.” (footnotes omitted)); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 399 n.2 (1974) (“Use of copyrighted material not in
conflict with a right secured [as an exclusive right] . . . , no matter how widespread, is not
copyright infringement. . . . ‘[Public] use short of infringement is to be encouraged.’”
(citation omitted)).
114
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Copyright law
forbids duplication, public performance, and so on, unless the person wishing to copy or
perform the work gets permission . . . .”).
115
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546–47 (1985)
(“Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the owner of
the copyright. Under the Copyright Act, these rights—to publish, copy, and distribute the
author’s work—vest in the author of an original work from the time of its creation. In
practice, the author commonly sells his rights to publishers who offer royalties in
exchange for their services in producing and marketing the author’s work.” (footnotes
and citations omitted)).
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author of a copyrighted work gains the opportunity to obtain a
financial reward for his or her creative labors.116
In this way, the copyright law fulfills the constitutional
objective of the promotion of the arts and sciences. The
mechanism of exclusive rights secures authors with property rights
in their creative works, and thereby provides them with the
opportunity for financial gain, the secular incentive to create.117
This incentive assures an abundance of creative works and
“reflects the belief that property rights [in creative works], properly
limited, will serve the general public interest in an abounding
national culture.”118 Finally, the mechanism of exclusive rights is
116

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 13.01; Yen, supra note 106, at 518
(“[C]opyright is necessary because in its absence those interested in using the author’s
work would simply copy the work instead of buying it from the author. Authors would
then find their economic returns too small to justify the costs of authorship. In such a
situation authors might not produce, and social welfare would presumably suffer. To
remedy this problem, economic theory supports granting authors copyright in their
works. However, those rights are necessarily limited in scope, because copyright
imposes costs on society in exchange for the benefits of induced creative activity. . . .
[T]he owner of copyright rights will charge a monopoly price for her work [and t]he
number of people who gain access to the work will therefore decrease. . . . Thus, the
optimal degree of copyright protection is that amount which maximizes the difference
between the benefits of induced creative activity and the costs of increased authors’
rights.” (footnotes omitted)).
117
See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“The Copyright Act promotes public access to knowledge because it provides an
economic incentive for authors to publish books and disseminate ideas to the public.”
(citation omitted)); Leval, supra note 106, at 1107–08 (“[C]opyright is intended to
increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge. . . . The rights conferred by
copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for
their labors. . . . [The Constitution’s grant of copyright power to Congress] ‘is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward . . . . The
monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the
public.’” (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545–46) (citations omitted).
118
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14; see also Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to
Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 43 (1994) [hereinafter Litman, Exclusive Right]
(“This is the central justification for further enhancing the rights in the copyright bundle:
without strong copyright protection, there will be no national information infrastructure.
The public might believe that what it wants is unfettered access to copyrighted works in
return for reasonable royalty payments to authors, but, if we let the public set the freight
charges, we risk underproduction of freight. If authors and publishers cannot reliably
control their works, they will decline to make them available at all.”); Patterson, supra
note 107, at 37 (“That copyright is a conditional right means that it is not so much a
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“properly limited” or counterbalanced by the fact that outside of
the exclusive rights, the public is free to use, enjoy, and build upon
an author’s copyrighted work, thereby “allow[ing] others to draw
[up]on these works in their own creative and educational
activities.”119
A. Classifying the “New Use” of Digital Re-Publication
Each time a new technological advance or development
provides a new means by which copyrighted works may be used or
exploited, a challenge is presented to the balance between the
reward as it is a quid pro quo. The author receives the reward for making his or her
original work of authorship accessible to all. Contrary to the common notion, the reward
is not for the act of creation, but for distribution to provide public access: public learning
comes not from the creation of a work, but from reading and studying it, a truism that
copyright owners have apparently managed to hide from courts for many years.”).
119
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14 (“The balance that copyright law strikes between
the incentives that authors and publishers need to produce original works and the freedom
that they and others need to draw on earlier copyrighted works rests on a judgment about
social benefit. To give greater property rights than are needed to obtain the desired
quantity and quality of works would impose costs on users without any countervailing
benefits to society. To give fewer property rights than are needed to support this
investment would give users freer access, but to a less than socially desirable number and
quality of works.” (footnote omitted)). Moreover, the mechanism of exclusive rights is
not without limitation. When the public interest so warrants, copyright doctrines such as
fair use permit a person to engage in the exclusive rights without the copyright holder’s
permission. See Sharon Appel, Copyright, Digitization of Images, and Art Museums:
Cyberspace and Other New Frontiers, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 150, 167 (1999)
(“[Exclusive] rights constitute the ‘bundle of rights’ that comprise copyright. Thus, they
constitute the core of copyright protection. However, the Copyright Act also sets forth
several limitations upon the exclusive rights. The most important of these . . . is the
doctrine of fair use, which permits unauthorized use of a copyrighted work where such
use, as a matter of public policy, is ‘fair.’ The statutory provision regarding fair use
provides that: ‘the fair use of a copyrighted work including such use . . . for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship or research is not an
infringement of copyright.’” (footnote omitted)); Simone A. Rose, Johnny Can Read, but
Can He “Surf”? Harmonizing Copyright Law and Internet Ethics, 1 MINN. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 79, 96 (2000) (“At first blush, copyright protection appears to upset the
constitutionally mandated balance between individualism and public dissemination of
information. It grants long-term exclusive rights in creative expression, without a
substantive examination process to evaluate whether the creator has ‘earned’ these rights
under the statute. Nevertheless, the trade- off for the longer term is a narrowly defined
set of exclusive rights, followed by a series of limitations such as fair use and first sale.
These limits set property boundaries that take into account the public’s interest in the free
dissemination of information.” (footnotes omitted)); see also infra Part IV.
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author’s incentive/exclusive rights mechanism and the corollary
objective of broad public access to creative works.120 Initially the
courts, and often ultimately Congress, must decide whether the
“new use” is one that falls within the category of exclusive rights,
or if it is a use that should remain freely available to the public.121
120

See Thornburg, supra note 2, at 237 (“Copyright law has always grappled with how
to adjust to new mediums of expression. In both the courts and Congress, advances in
recording, reproducing, and distributing copyrighted works have always led to tension in
fashioning appropriate mechanisms to protect authors without creating an imbalance or
unfavorable results. While copyright vests appropriate rights in an author in order to
compensate her for her labor, it also seeks to protect the public from unreasonable
seizures of works already in the public domain.”); Litman, Exclusive Right, supra note
118, at 39 (“It is difficult for intellectual property laws to keep pace with technology.
When technological advances cause ambiguity in the law, courts rely on the law’s
purposes to resolve that ambiguity. However, when technology gets too far ahead of the
law, and it becomes difficult and awkward to apply the old principles, it is time for
reevaluation and change. ‘Even though the 1976 Copyright Act was carefully drafted to
be flexible enough to be applied to future innovations, technology has a habit of
outstripping even the most flexible statutes.’ The coat is getting a little tight. There is no
need for a new one, but the old one needs a few alterations.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO.101735, at 7 (1990))).
121
See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1309–10 (2003) (“The role of the
common law and legislature is to balance property and liability interests. . . . If all
property is subject to the legal balance between the exclusive owner and the public, then
intellectual property is merely the realm in which the balancing is most explicitly
acknowledged. . . . The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the power of Congress
to adjust the balance of rights between authors, publishers, and the public. . . . The
normative question is not whether such balancing can take place, but how to create a
reasoned framework for setting or shifting the balance.” (footnotes omitted)); Wendy M.
Pollack, Note, Tuning in: The Future of Copyright Protection for Online Music in the
Digital Millennium, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2445, 2445 (2000) (“Since the advent of the
Gutenberg printing press, copyright law and technology have been entangled in an
ongoing legal chase. In order to advance the quintessential goal of American copyright
law, . . . Congress constantly must balance the law’s objectives: to promote widespread
dissemination of original creative works, while providing incentives to authors and
owners to create such works. New technological advances continuously upset this
balance by facilitating the ability to copy works without permission from copyright
holders . . . . However, as developments such as radio, television, and video have
demonstrated, worries over the demise of copyright protection have been overstated. In
fact, such technological developments usually have been met with a ceaseless round of
amendments to the United States copyright laws.” (footnotes omitted)). But see Warner
Lawson, Jr., Paul, Bishop & Meachum—Short-Lived Aberrations or Plagues-onDeveloping Due Process-Protections?, 20 HOW. L.J. 419, 427 (1977) (“Although the
institution of property is ancient in comparison with liberty, interests in property appear
more fragile and, thus more susceptible to attack. Property is particularly vulnerable in
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As has been the case in connection with many prior new uses
for copyrighted material, the categorization of the new use of
digital re-publication is not a simple task. The copyright holders in
Tasini, Greenberg, and Random House each took the position that
digital re-publication should be regarded as an activity or use
within the realm of the author’s exclusive rights.122 Although the
copyright statute does not specifically refer to digital re-publication
as an exclusive right, the plaintiff copyright holders argued that a
person who digitally re-publishes copyrighted material is engaging
in several of those uses that have been expressly enumerated as
exclusive rights, specifically the exclusive rights of reproduction,
distribution, and public display.123 Consequently, the copyright
holders contended that they were entitled to control and profit from
any digital re-publication of their works.124
Although the defendants in Tasini, Greenberg, and Random
House each asserted defenses in response to the copyright
infringement claims interposed against them, they effectively
conceded that digital re-publication simulates or incorporates some
exclusive rights.125 In both Tasini and Greenberg, the defendants’
principal infringement defense was to characterize digital republication activities as conduct within one or more of the
statutory “exemptions” which permit engagement in the exclusive
rights without the copyright holder’s permission—in this case the
§ 201(c) revision privilege.126 In Random House, where the
dispute was between two licensees of the copyright holder, the
defendant/subsequent licensee contended that Random House’s
prior license was limited to the exercise of certain exclusive rights
serving its contemporary purpose-protecting those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives from arbitrary deprivation.”).
122
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001); Greenberg v. Nat’l
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta
Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2002).
123
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 498; Greenberg, 244 F. 3d at 1272 n.9; Random House, 150
F. Supp. 2d at 620.
124
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 491, 498; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1270; Random House, 150
F. Supp. 2d at 614, 620–21.
125
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 499; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272; Random House, 150 F.
Supp. 2d at 621 n.6.
126
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 492; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272.
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in connection with the use of the copyrighted works in print
media.127 The defendant argued that the copyright holders had
legitimately granted the subsequent license, which authorized the
defendant to engage in many of the same exclusive rights, but in
connection with the use of the works in electronic media.128 Thus,
notwithstanding their substantive copyright defenses, the
defendants in all three cases implicitly conceded that digital republication falls within the copyright holder’s exclusive rights.
The identification of any of exclusive rights simulated by or
incorporated within a new use for copyrighted material is a
reasonable method by which to determine the appropriate
author/exclusive rights versus public/free access classification for
that new use. It is not, however, the only reasonable method.
Another legitimate approach to the new-use classification problem
is to consider the new use as sui generis—that is, as an activity
unique and distinguishable from any existing uses, including any
exclusive rights that may be simulated by or incorporated within
the new use.
In deciding which uses of copyrighted material should be
relegated to the copyright holder as exclusive rights, Congress has
the opportunity to consider a variety of factors, including the
nature of each particular use and the effect that removing the use
from the public enjoyment is likely to have on the underlying
objectives of copyright law.129 The fact that a new use simulates
or incorporates an existing exclusive right, however, does not
obviate the need to engage in the same analysis with respect to the
new use. Although a new use may simulate or incorporate one or
more existing exclusive rights, that new use may also exhibit other
characteristics and may also implicate policy issues independent of
127

See Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 614.
See id.
129
See Garon, supra note 121, at 1326–27 (“Congress has the legislative authority to tip
the balance in favor of copyright owners or towards the public on a case-by-case basis.
Except for possible constitutional limitations, Congress can shape the balance across a
wide spectrum of issues.” (footnote omitted)); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 1.14 (“The
premise of social benefit imports a value judgment and an empirical judgment. Every
time Congress amends the Copyright Act, it makes a value judgment about the quantity
and quality of literary, musical and artistic works that are socially desirable and an
empirical judgment about the amendment’s probable efficacy in achieving that end.”).
128
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those presented by any of the exclusive rights it might incorporate
or resemble. The presence of these additional characteristics and
policy issues may compel an entirely different conclusion in the
exclusive rights versus public free access assessment.130
Accordingly, approaching the new use of digital re-publication as
merely a simulation or combination of the exclusive rights of
reproduction, distribution, and/or public display is somewhat akin
to regarding a cake as merely a serving of eggs, milk, and flour.
B. Fortnightly and Teleprompter: When Cable Television Was a
“New Use”
Evaluating digital re-publication as a sui generis use
notwithstanding its simulation or incorporation of certain exclusive
rights is not an entirely new idea. Arguably, this was the approach
undertaken by the Supreme Court when it was confronted with the
classification question in connection with the then new
technological use of cable re-transmission of network television
broadcasts in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.131
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.132
130

See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 268 (1996)
(“Cyberspace is arguably different from previous technologies that were traditionally
covered by copyright law in many respects. . . . The argument that two things are
different or alike is relative to a governing principle of relevancy. It is one thing to show
that digital technology differs from other technologies in terms of the way the
information is represented, in the speed of processing information, and in the shape and
costs of processors. It is quite another thing to determine which of these differences is
relevant for the assignment of rights in digitized products. . . . [O]ne should focus on the
differences that are relevant to the promotion of the constitutional goals of copyright law.
The relevant changes created by digital technology are those that affect the balance of
power between copyright owners and users.”); Hamilton, supra note 106, at 343
(“Congress’s power over copyright law [is] not ‘unlimited’ but rather tethered to the
public purposes the [Copyright] Clause identifies.” (footnote omitted)); Peter Jaszi,
Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 300 (1996) (“Net user’s
understanding of rights and duties, grounded as that understanding is in an ethic of
information sharing. . . . [I]nformation is a special kind of property, one which—unlike a
ball or a jacket—improves, rather than degrades, with use. . . . [T]he understanding of
rights in information which traditionally has characterized American copyright—one in
which the public interest in reasonable access to information has been afforded as much
weight, in balancing, as the private interest in control.”).
131
392 U.S. 390, 393–94 (1968).
132
415 U.S. 394, 399–400 (1974).
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In the early efforts to commercially exploit cable television
technology, cable network entrepreneurs often erected broadcast
receiving antennae in or near remote regions, where residents were
unable to receive network television broadcasts using only
conventional television sets.133 These antennae were erected for
the purpose of capturing network broadcasts being transmitted
through the air, which were then re-transmitted via cable to area
residents for a fee.134
In response to this unauthorized use of their copyrighted
broadcasts, the holders of the copyrights in televised programs
instigated copyright infringement litigation against the cable
entrepreneurs.135 The network copyright holders argued that cable
re-transmission constituted an unauthorized engagement in one of
their exclusive rights, specifically the exclusive right to perform
their works publicly.136
Although cable re-transmission at least simulated the public
performance right,137 the Supreme Court refused to evaluate the

133

See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 399–400 (“The operations of [commercial cable]
systems typically involved the reception of broadcast beams by means of special
television antennae . . . , transmission of these electronic signals by means of cable or a
combination of cable and point-to-point microwave to the homes of subscribers, and the
conversion of the electromagnetic signals into images and sounds by means of the
subscribers’ own television sets.” (footnotes omitted)).
134
See id.
135
See id.; Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 393.
136
See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 396–97. In a dissenting
opinion in Teleprompter, Justice Blackmun argued that cable re-transmission constituted
engagement in the exclusive right of reproduction: “A [cable operator] that builds an
antenna to pick up telecasts in Area B and then transmits it by cable to Area A is
reproducing the copyrighted work, not pursuant to a license from the owner of the
copyright, but by theft.” 415 U.S. at 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Indeed, it would
seem that cable re-transmission could be considered a combination or simulation of three
separate exclusive rights: reproduction, distribution, and public performance or display.
137
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556–57 (M.D. Fla.
1993). (“Public distribution of a copyrighted work is a right reserved to the copyright
owner . . . . The concept of display . . . covers ‘the projection of an image on a screen or
other surface by any method, the transmission of an image by electronic or other means,
and the showing of an image on a cathode ray tube, or similar viewing apparatus
connected with any sort of information storage and retrieval system.’ The display right
precludes unauthorized transmission of the display from one place to another, for
example, by a computer system. ‘Display’ covers any showing of a ‘copy’ of the work,
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new use solely from the perspective of whether the public
performance right or any other exclusive rights were simulated by
the new use.138 Instead, emphasizing the fact that cable retransmission exhibited both exclusive right and public free access
characteristics, the Court evaluated it as a sui generis activity.139
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that cable re-transmission is
closer in character to uses relegated to the public than it is to the
exclusive right of public performance:
[Television b]roadcasters perform.
Viewers do not
perform. Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play
crucial roles in the total television process, a line is drawn
between them. One is treated as active performer; the
other, as passive beneficiary.
When [cable re-transmission] is considered in this
framework, we conclude that it falls on the viewer’s side of
the line. Essentially, a [cable re-transmission] system no
more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the
broadcaster’s signals . . . . If an individual erected an
antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed
the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be
“performing” the programs he received on his television
set. . . . The only difference in the case of [cable retransmission] is that the antenna system is erected and
owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.140
Although Congress would eventually overrule the Supreme
Court and specifically designate cable re-transmission as an

‘either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image or any other device or
process.’” (citations omitted)).
138
See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–400; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408 (“When a
television broadcaster transmits a program, it has made public for simultaneous viewing
and hearing the contents of that program. The privilege of receiving the broadcast
electronic signals and of converting them into the sights and sounds of the program
inheres in all members of the public who have the means of doing so. The reception and
rechanneling of these signals for simultaneous viewing is essentially a viewer
function . . . .”).
139
See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–400; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408.
140
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–400 (footnotes omitted); see also Teleprompter, 415
U.S. at 408.
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exclusive right,141 it did so in a manner that lent credence to the
Supreme Court’s reluctance to approach cable re-transmission as
no more than a simulation or combination of certain pre-existing
exclusive rights.142 On one of the few occasions in the history of
the American copyright law, Congress imposed a compulsory
license143 in connection with its designation of cable retransmission as an exclusive right.144 This meant that although
Congress granted television network copyright holders the right to
profit from the new use of cable re-transmission, it did not grant
them the right to control it. Instead, Congress determined that
given the nature of cable re-transmission, when considered in light
of the underlying objectives of the copyright law, the public should
be guaranteed the ability to engage in and enjoy the new use for
copyrighted material.145
141

See 17 U.S.C. § 111; Rooks, supra note 105, at 267–68.
Rooks, supra note 105, at 267–68.
143
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES
COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS i, iv (1997) (“A compulsory license
is a statutory copyright licensing scheme whereby copyright owners are required to
license their works to users at a government-fixed price and under government-set terms
and conditions. . . . Compulsory licenses are an exception to the copyright principle of
exclusive ownership for authors of creative works, and, historically, the Copyright Office
has only supported the creation of compulsory licenses when warranted by special
circumstances. With respect to the cable and satellite compulsory licenses, those special
circumstances were initially seen as the difficulty and expense of clearing all rights on a
broadcast signal.”), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ (last visited Jan. 26,
2004).
144
See Baoding Hsieh Fan, When Channel Surfers Flip to the Web: Copyright Liability
for Internet Broadcasting, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 619, 629–30 (2000) (“In response to two
Supreme Court decisions that had held that cable retransmission of broadcast signals did
not constitute copyright infringement under the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress amended
the Copyright Act in 1976 to specify that retransmissions of broadcast signals—either
local or distant, network or independent—are public performances and, therefore, fall
within the exclusive rights granted by copyright protection. Section 111 subjects
secondary transmissions by cable systems to copyright liability by means of a
compulsory license and payment of statutory license fees for certain retransmissions.
Later, in order to facilitate the home satellite dish business, Congress passed the Satellite
Home Viewer Act of 1988, which created the satellite carrier compulsory license.”
(footnotes omitted)).
145
See id. (“A fundamental principle of copyright is that copyrighted works should not
be exploited without the consent of the copyright owners. The cable and satellite
compulsory licenses are exceptions to this principle. A compulsory license ‘represents a
derogation from the basic copyright principles embodied in the Copyright Act that ensure
to copyright owners the right to control the use of their creations.’ The cable and satellite
142
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C. Digital Re-Publication: Sui Generis Use or a New Exclusive
Right?
In related contexts, other commentators have argued that
digital use and dissemination of copyrighted material are quite
distinct from any of the traditional uses of copyrighted material.146
compulsory licenses comprise a statutory copyright licensing scheme whereby copyright
owners are required to license their works to cable systems and satellite carriers at a
government-fixed price and under government-set terms and conditions.” (footnotes
omitted)). For an in-depth discussion of the public interest in the interface between
intellectual property dissemination and federal regulation of the telecommunication
infrastructure, see Leonard M. Baynes & C. Anthony Bush, The Other Digital Divide:
Disparity in the Auction of Wireless Telecommunications, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 351
(2003).
146
See, e.g., Garon, supra note 121, at 1335–36 (“Scholars have described the Internet
as ‘a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.’ The
Internet can facilitate an ever expanding range of information flow and entertainment
activities that include passive listening and viewing of music, film, and audiovisual
works, interactive gaming, instant messaging, file sharing, collaborative authoring, and a
host of other activities. . . . Digital storage and transmission also allow for virtually
perfect reproduction of [material converted into digital formats], with the ability to copy
and transmit each file having essentially no reproduction cost . . . . The format of the
digital file results in a conflation of ideas, information, and the copyrighted expression, as
the ‘computer file’ becomes the unitary metaphor for all three attributes of the work.”
(footnotes omitted)); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75
OR. L. REV. 19, 19–20 (1996) [hereinafter Litman, Revising] (“Our current copyright law
is based on a model devised for print media, and expanded with some difficulty to
embrace a world that includes live, filmed and taped performances, broadcast media, and,
most recently, digital media. That much is uncontroversial. The suitability of that model
for new media is much more controversial. . . . [S]ince any use of a computer to view,
read, reread, hear or otherwise experience a work in digital form requires reproducing
that work in a computer’s memory, and since the copyright statute gives the copyright
holder exclusive control over reproductions, everybody needs to have either a statutory
privilege or the copyright holder’s permission to view, read, reread, hear or otherwise
experience a digital work . . . . [This syllogism, however,] neatly avoids addressing the
policy question whether copyright should be defined in terms that convert individual
users’ reading of files into potentially infringing acts, by insisting that Congress chose to
set it up this way when it enacted the current law.” (footnotes omitted)); Pamela
Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital
Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 102–103
(1993) (“[There is an] extraordinary array of electronic information tools now
available . . . that permit users to experiment with the plastic nature of works in digital
form. By plasticity, I mean the ease with which such works can be manipulated,
transformed, and/or inserted into other works. Although many authors might prefer for
their works to remain as fixed as they have traditionally been in printed form, the genie of
plasticity cannot be pushed back into the bottle. Digital manipulation is here to stay, for
the manipulability of digital data is one of the key advantages of the digital medium.”
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These commentators have emphasized the fact that digital use and
dissemination involves attributes and applications far beyond
anything contemplated by authors, publishers, and/or legislators
when they have considered more traditional methods of
reproduction, distribution, and/or public display of copyrighted
material.147
Thus, it seems inappropriate to approach the
(footnotes omitted)); Jed Scully, Beyond Napster—Is It Just Music? Or Are Judicial
Resolutions Ineffective in Digital Commerce?, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 313, 319–20 (2002)
(“From the beginning of the digital age and the decision to include digital expressive
code as ‘literary works’ under the Copyright Act, there has been a continuing tension
between ideas, concepts, systems, and common modes of expression in digital form on
one hand, and digital works of authorship expressed in software and embedded in code in
hardware on the other. . . . A more basic question remains in asking whether copyright
law will work in a digital, untethered, global environment, or whether our understanding
of copyright is too bound up with geographic metes and bounds, with paper and pen,
Tower Record stores, and multiplex movie houses.” (footnote omitted)); Ivan K. Fong,
Law and New Technology: The Virtues of Muddling Through the Digital Dilemma:
Intellectual Property in the Information Age, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 445, 447
(2001) (book review) (“‘[M]any of the intellectual property rules and practices that
evolved in the world of physical artifacts do not work well in the digital
environment’ . . . . [U]nlike access to traditional media (reading a book, watching a
movie, or listening to a CD), access to digital works inevitably requires the making of a
copy, and that, unlike copying traditional works, copying digital works is easy,
inexpensive, and produces perfect copies. Add to that the fact that computer networks
now make global distribution of that information inexpensive and nearly instantaneous,
and one can easily see how existing copyright law, which might have prohibited (or at
least tolerated) the individual copying contemplated in the analog world of traditional
media, might be ill-suited to deal with the sort of mass copying rendered simple and
commonplace on the Internet.”).
147
See Scully, supra note 146, at 319 (“The nature of experimentation and development
of derivative works, of criticism, analysis, even hacking for analytical purposes,
necessarily involves digital copying to engage in those protected functions in a way
unnoticed and beyond the control of rights holders in an analog age.”); Elkin-Koren,
supra note 130, at 254–55 (“Digitization . . . allows users to easily retransmit materials.
Users may use scanners to digitize photos or texts that are published in a traditional form.
A digitized copy that was delivered through the network may be downloaded by the user
and retransmitted. Retransmission through digitized versions is both easy and
inexpensive. Everything digitized may be reproduced in seconds and at low cost. Selfpublishing is also available through network communication. . . . Cyberspace integrates
the generation and distribution of information. Digital networks provide direct
communication between authors and potential readers. . . . Consequently, everyone with
access to a computer network may become a publisher. Network distribution creates a
continuum that goes from personal writing on one hand, to publication on the other, with
many degrees of connectivity and access permissions in between.” (footnotes omitted));
Pollack, supra note 121, at 2445 (“Digitization of copyrighted materials permits
instantaneous, simplified copying methods that produce nearly perfect copies of originals.
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classification of digital re-publication solely on the basis of its
simulation or incorporation of these pre-existing exclusive
rights.148
Consistent with the policy objectives that underlie the
copyright law, courts typically resist the entreaties of copyright
holders to expand the realm of exclusive rights to a “default”
classification option, to be invoked when confronted with a new
technological use that does not easily fit into the exclusive
rights/public free access dichotomy.149 Indeed, traditional judicial
These copies can be digitally delivered to thousands of Internet users. Decentralization
and anonymity in cyberspace have allowed for the widespread dissemination of
copyrighted materials without permission from their owners.” (footnotes omitted)).
148
See Litman, Revising, supra note 146, at 36–37 (“When the old copyright laws fixed
on reproduction as the compensable (or actionable) unit, it wasn’t because there was
something fundamentally invasive of an author’s rights about making a copy of
something. Rather, it was because, at the time, copies were easy to find and easy to
count, so they were a useful benchmark for deciding when a copyright owner’s rights had
been unlawfully invaded. . . . They are less useful measures today. . . . By
happenstance . . . , control over reproduction could potentially allow copyright owners
control over every use of digital technology in connection with their protected works.
This is not what the Congresses in 1790, 1870, 1909 and 1976 meant to accomplish when
they awarded copyright owners exclusive reproduction rights.”); Samuelson, supra note
146, at 53 (“When . . . new technology present[s] an issue that [can] not be readily
answered from the copyright statute, the regulatory view of copyright would have courts
go back to first principles to determine which result would best achieve the societal
purposes of copyright law.” (footnote omitted)); Scully, supra note 146, at 322 (“[W]e
must acknowledge in the law and in practice that controlling copyright by outlawing or
preventing technological change is fruitless and self defeating.”).
149
See Hamilton, supra note 106, at 326 (“ [W]hen new technologies appeared for
which there was no existing analogy in the statute, the Court was inclined to deny authors
the power to control or benefit from the new technology through copyright law. . . . [I]t
took seriously the Copyright Clause’s charge to further the ‘Progress of Science [or
knowledge] and useful Arts,’ and interpreted this language to mean that the Clause places
the public interest ahead of all others.”); Litman, Revising, supra note 146, at 22 (“[T]he
contours of [the digital technology/copyright] dispute don’t look very different from the
shape of very similar disputes that arose in the 1980s, when the gods invented personal
computers; or the 1970s, when they invented videocassette recorders; or the 1960s, when
they invented cable television; or the 1920s, when they invented commercial
broadcasting and talkies. Arguing that Congress already considered a question, and
resolved it in one’s favor then, is a common tactic in the history of copyright lobbying
because it bypasses the problem of persuading Congress to consider the question and
resolve it in one’s favor today.” (footnote omitted)); Fong, supra note 146, at 448 (“New
technology and new business models for delivering content are almost always greeted
with the belief that they will destroy the existing market. In 17th century England, the
emergence of lending libraries was seen as the death knell of book stores; in the 20th
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construction of American copyright as positive law imposed for
the public benefit mandates the rejection of an exclusive rights
“default” approach.150
century, photocopying was seen as the end of the publishing business, and videotape the
end of the movie business. Yet in each case, the new development produced a new
market far larger than the impact it had on the existing market. Lending libraries gave
inexpensive access to books that were too expensive to purchase, thereby helping to make
literacy widespread and vastly increasing the sale of books. Similarly, the ability to
photocopy makes the printed material in a library more valuable to consumers, while
videotapes have significantly increased viewing of movies.” (footnote omitted)).
150
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the
terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his
writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and
progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited
periods the exclusive rights to their writings.’ Congress thus seeks to define the rights
included in copyright so as to serve the public welfare and not necessarily so as to
maximize an author’s control over his or her product.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222,
at 7 (1909)); REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON GENERAL REVISION OF THE
COPYRIGHT LAW I-5 (1961) (“The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under
the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his
writings, for the Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely statutory
rights. . . . The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that Congress
shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 602222 (1908)); Brown, supra note 105, at 592–93 (“The copyright-patent clause is the
only one of the enumerated powers of Congress that is prefaced by a statement of
purpose: ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ The clause does not say
‘to maximize the returns to authors and inventors.’ . . . [W]hen one considers the
solemnity of the clause, the Supreme Court’s continuing concern for the public good, and
the deeply rooted understanding that copyright flows from acts of Congress and not from
natural right, one thing seems clear. When Congress legislates and courts fill in the blank
spaces, both branches need ways to assess and balance the expected public good and
private rewards.” (footnotes omitted)); Garon, supra note 121, at 1306–07 (“The power
to create a balance between the author and the public may be the most significant
philosophical distinction between a natural rights theory of copyright and an economic
rationale. Under the natural rights theory, the power over one’s writings is a ‘sacred’
liberty that cannot be limited for the public good, whereas the economic rationale allows
for a balancing between the interests of the public in accessing the good and the right of
the author to receive an economic reward.” (footnotes omitted)); Patterson, supra note
107, at 4 (“[T]he Copyright Clause is specifically a limitation on, as well as a grant of,
Congress’s power. The limitations are manifest in three basic policies expressed in the
Copyright Clause: the promotion of learning . . . ; the protection of the public domain . . .
; and the benefit for the author . . . . The policies are not wholly consistent—protection of
the public domain necessarily limits the benefit to the author—and the careful phrasing of
the Copyright Clause to include them all indicates a specific purpose: protection against
the misuse of copyright. A misuse would occur, for example, if a copyright owner used
copyright to inhibit rather than promote learning . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Rooks, supra
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When the traditional copyright analogues do not satisfactorily
apply, it is appropriate for Congress to act.151 Congress is best
equipped to determine the appropriate manner in which to
interpret, apply, and if necessary, amend the copyright law in order
to address a sui generis challenge to the constitutional copyright
objective and the established copyright framework.152 It is the
note 105, at 258 (“[T]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited
grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors . . . and to allow the public access to the products
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.” (footnotes
omitted)).
151
See Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An Emerging
Solution to an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 406 (2002) (“[I]n the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the Congress did legislate specifically with respect to
the use of copyright as a tie to control an aftermarket. In its amendments to [§] 117,
Congress formulated a more precise policy about the use of copyrighted software as a
tying product. Congress, in effect, told us that a copyrighted software program which is
activated whenever equipment is turned on may not be leveraged to control the market
for maintenance and repair services of that machine.” (footnote omitted)); Litman,
Revising, supra note 146, at 31–32 (“Copyright owners . . . have never been entitled to
control all uses of their works. Instead, Congress has accorded copyright owners some
exclusive rights, and reserved other rights to the general public. . . . Indeed, it is
conventional to argue that copyright holders should receive only such incentives as are
necessary to impel them to create and disseminate new works.” (footnotes omitted));
Mtima, supra note 33, at 406 (“In 1998 the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (‘DMCA’)
became law, amending various aspects of the copyright law to address some of the
unique issues presented by advances in digital information technology . . . . Among other
things, the DMCA virtually extinguishes Internet access provider liability in connection
with the misconduct of third parties, such as cybersquatters and bulletin board operators
and/or users. In addition, the DMCA generally prohibits the circumvention of encryption
and other mechanisms implemented to protect copyrighted material . . . . [Yet another]
significant change resulting from the enactment of the DMCA . . . concerns . . . RAM
copies . . . [—the] “copying” [that] occurs when a computer program is transferred from a
permanent storage device to a computer’s random access memory . . . . As a result of the
passage of the DMCA, [unauthorized] RAM copying [under certain] circumstances no
longer constitutes copyright infringement . . . .” (citations omitted)).
152
See, e.g., Litman, Revising, supra note 146, at 33–34 (detailing previous
Congressional provisions for specific technologies); Samuelson, supra note 146, at 63
(“Taking a regulatory approach to resolving a hotly contested case involving a new
technology issue is particularly appropriate when copyright claimants make
unprecedented claims about the reach of their rights . . . .”); Fong, supra note 146, at 447
(“Further complicating these issues . . . are the wide-ranging and often conflicting
interests of multiple stakeholders, which range from intellectual property creators to
intellectual property distributors, schools and libraries, the general public, and other
consumers and producers of intellectual property (governmental organizations, private
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responsibility of Congress to assess whether the overarching goals
of the copyright law are best served by designating a new use as an
exclusive right, a use as to which the public should be given free
reign, or a use that warrants the application of a customized
response, such as a compulsory license.153
Until the issue of classification of digital re-publication is
placed squarely before the courts and/or Congress, however,
existing precedent remains based on the premise that digital republication simulates, incorporates, or otherwise impinges upon at
least some of the copyright holder’s existing exclusive rights.154
From this perspective, a defendant accused of copyright
infringement through digital re-publication must either prove
possession of an appropriate license, as successfully argued by the

sector organizations, journalists, and standards organizations); Cynthia M. Ho, Attacking
the Copyright Evildoers in Cyberspace, 55 SMU L. REV. 1561, 1561–62 (2002) (“In the
context of copyrights on the Internet, different evildoers are identified, depending on who
is asked to identify the evildoers. For example, to most consumers, the evildoers in
cyberspace are the copyright owners that have stripped the Internet of its freewheeling
nature by removing things such as the file-sharing tool Napster. On the other hand, major
copyright owners vilify consumers—and those who assist them—for making copies of
copyrighted material with little regard for whether the consumers own original copies.
The identification of evildoers implicitly discounts the possibility that parties merely
possess differing, but reasonable views. Rather, the current polarized vision of evildoers
has created a situation in which consumers are immune to allegations of copyright piracy
and content owners rush to create new methods—whether legal or technological—to halt
consumer copying.” (footnotes omitted)). Recognizing and reconciling these diverse
interests—and the need to view the issues through the lenses of technology, law,
economics, psychology and sociology, and public policy—are important first steps in the
balancing exercise that is at the heart of the current digital policy debate . . . .”).
153
See Hughes, supra note 109, at 288 (“As our attention continues to shift from
tangible to intangible forms of property, we can expect a growing jurisprudence of
intellectual property. The foundation for such a jurisprudence must be built from an
understanding of the philosophical justifications for property rights to ideas . . . .”);
Litman, Exclusive Right, supra note 118, at 33–34 (“[B]efore we succumb to calls for
further enhancement of the rights in the copyright bundle, we need to reexamine the
intellectual property bargain from the vantage point of the public, on whose behalf, after
all, the copyright deal is said to be struck in the first place.” (footnotes omitted)). For
example, the compulsory license mechanism seems well suited to address many of the
dilemmas presented by digital information technology. I will explore this question as a
solution to the problem of copyright infringement through the use of MP-3 technology in
a forthcoming article.
154
See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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defendant in Random House,155 or must demonstrate that his or her
digital re-publication activities qualify for exemption from the
requirement that they be conducted with the copyright holder’s
consent, the strategy pursued by the defendants in Tasini and
Greenberg.156
As discussed in Part I, the principal argument advanced by the
defendants in Tasini and Greenberg was that their activities were
exempt from the requirement of authorization by the copyright
holder because they fell within the revision privilege provided by
§ 201(c). The validity of this position, particularly with respect to
exact digital replicas of printed works, is explored in the next
section.
III. UNAUTHORIZED DIGITAL RE-PUBLICATION AND § 201(C)
As discussed in Part II, copyright holders are granted certain
exclusive property rights in their works. When others encroach
upon these rights, the law provides the copyright holder with an
action for copyright infringement.157
A claim of copyright infringement in the electronic
media/digital re-publication context involves the same sequential
analysis as in assessing infringement claims raised in connection
with traditional media. First, the court must determine that the
plaintiff has demonstrated ownership of a valid copyright.158
155

See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
156
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488; Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267,
1270 (11th Cir. 2001).
157
See Appel, supra note 119, at 170 (“Copyright infringement is defined as the
unprivileged violation of any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. Thus,
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, publication, performance, or public display of a
copyrighted work without permission of the copyright owner amounts to infringement
unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.”
(footnotes omitted)); Pollack, supra note 121, at 2456 (“The Copyright Act does not
require a showing of intent on the part of a direct infringer, hence, the infringer is liable
whether or not he was aware that he was using copyrighted material in an illegal manner.
Infringement occurs even when only one copy of a work is made, for example, where a
consumer reproduces a copy solely for private purposes.” (footnotes omitted)).
158
A certificate of copyright registration constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity
of a copyright. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir.
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Second, the plaintiff must adduce evidence that the defendant has
engaged in one or more of the exclusive rights in connection with
original constituent elements of the copyrighted work.159
Where there is no dispute regarding the validity of the
plaintiff’s copyright, analysis of the infringement claim begins
with a determination of whether the unauthorized electronic
publication involves one or more of the exclusive rights, and if so,
which ones.160 Once it has been established that the unauthorized
electronic activity involves one or more of the exclusive rights, the
resolution of the infringement claim will turn on the nature of the
defense raised in support of the unauthorized use.161 Unless the
infringement defendant asserts some claim of license, he or she
must rely instead upon one of the copyright defenses that permit

1995) (citing Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir.
1990)). Unless such prima facie validity is affirmatively rebutted by the copyright
defendant, the copyright plaintiff need only demonstrate unauthorized copying to
establish her cause for infringement. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9
F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir. 1993).
159
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 587 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984);
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (2001); Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992); SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp.
2d 1075, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366–67 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Ryan C.
Edwards, Note, Who Said Nothing in This World Is Free? A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc.: Problems Presented, Solutions Explored, and Answers Posed, 89 KY. L.J. 835, 842–
43 (2000/2001); see generally Koenigsberg, supra note 112, at 148.
160
See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620–24
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F.
Supp. 611, 613; Koons, 960 F.2d at 306; cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 13.01
(outlining the necessary elements in an infringement action). Identifying the specific
exclusive rights at issue from the outset can be helpful in efficiently evaluating the
infringement claim, in as much as analyzing a claim of unauthorized reproduction, for
example, is likely to involve different factual issues and evidentiary findings than
analyzing a claim of unauthorized production of a derivative work.
161
See generally e.g., Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (analyzing the meaning of
the contract language, in a case in which the defendant claimed that the authors’ licensing
agreements with the plaintiff did not grant electronic rights).
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engagement in the exclusive rights without the copyright holder’s
consent.162
A. Interpreting § 201(c) in the Wake of Tasini and Greenberg
In Tasini and Greenberg, the publishers were unable to
produce license agreements authorizing their digital re-publication
activities.163 Instead, they sought refuge in the revision privilege
embodied in § 201(c), which permits publishers to use contributory
works in revisions without the authorization of the authors of those
works.164
The courts did not agree with the plaintiffs’ expansive
interpretation of § 201(c). The courts in Tasini and Greenberg
held that the reproduction of a printed collective work into a digital
format can result in both the disassembly of the work and the
dissolution of the publisher’s creative editorial contribution, and
thereby constitute an entirely new publication of the contributory
works.165 In such cases, the digital re-publication does not qualify
as a revision within the meaning of § 201(c).166
The principal holding in both Tasini and Greenberg—that the
nature and extent of any alterations made to the original collective
work in producing a subsequent version will determine whether
that version is a revision of the original or a new work167—seems
162
Compare id., with N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001). In Tasini,
unlike Random House, the defendant publishers looked to the § 201 “privilege,” rather
than to any contract language.
163
See Alan Gruber, Note, Interpretation of “Revision” Under the Copyright Act Spells
Trouble for Publishers: Greenberg v. National Geographic Society, 4 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 223, 229 (2002) (“Over the last twenty years, technological advancements
and their rapid emergence and integration into the daily lives of many, caught some offguard, including publishers. This is demonstrated by the noticeable absence of a clause
addressing copyright ownership in electronic databases in Greenberg’s and other
freelancer[s’] contracts.”); cf. Vermylen, supra note 92, at 198 (“[In Random House the
publisher] relied on . . . clauses in its contracts with the authors—clauses that are
common in publishing contracts—to advance its argument that the contracts signed by
the authors decades ago foreclosed the authors from selling electronic rights to any third
party.” (footnote omitted)). For further discussion in this area, see Part V.
164
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272.
165
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502–04; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73.
166
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502–04; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73.
167
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 496–97; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73.
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in retrospect fairly straightforward. Thus, whether the later version
is produced in print, digital format, or some other medium, Tasini
and Greenberg clarify that the § 201(c) revision privilege is a
narrow one, which permits only an appropriate updating of the
original collective work as a whole, and does not extend to changes
to the individual contributory works therein, the use of the
contributory works in the creation or assembly of a new collective
work, or similar incursions into the author’s realm of exclusive
rights.168
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Tasini distinguished a
publisher’s § 201(c) revision privilege from the independent ability
of contributory authors to affirmatively license their exclusive
rights.169 The Court explained that the revision privilege should
not be construed as a de facto license to engage in any of the
contributory authors’ exclusive rights.170 Rather, § 201(c) merely
provides publishers a limited “privilege” to impinge upon certain
rights in order to undertake a specified activity such as updating or
revising a collective work.171 Any “non-revision” engagement in
the contributory authors’ exclusive rights, electronic or otherwise,
must be specifically licensed by the individual copyright holders
and effectuated in accordance with the provisions of the copyright
statute.172
168

See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 496–97; Greenberg, 244 F. 3d at 1272–74. Thus, in a very
real sense the opinions in Tasini and Greenberg have more to do with the clarification of
§ 201(c) than with the specific application of the copyright law to the new information
technologies. Had the works at issue not been collective works, the courts’ initial
confrontation with the digital re-publication issue would likely have required a broader
application of the copyright law, as opposed to the divination of a relatively obscure
copyright privilege in connection with a narrow specie of copyrighted material.
169
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 503–04.
170
See id. at 496–97, 500–01, 503–04.
171
Thus, the revision privilege is distinguished from the publisher’s own independent
copyright and exclusive rights in the collective work as a whole. The revision privilege
merely serves to prevent the restoration of the author’s contributory work copyright from
becoming a “veto power” against the publisher’s ability to revise and update the
collective work, which benefits society. See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804,
815–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that there is “a competing goal of ensuring that
collective works be marketed and distributed to the public”), rev’d and remanded, 206
F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
172
Emphasizing the distinction between the basis for the collective work copyright and
the purpose and parameters of the revision privilege also supports the conclusion that

MTIMA FORMAT

2004]

3/31/2004 4:21 PM

TASINI AND ITS PROGENY

419

B. Exact Digital Replicas: Revisions or New Publications?
In clarifying the breadth of the revision privilege, however, the
Tasini and Greenberg analyses also raised some unresolved issues
specifically pertinent to digital re-publication. In reaching their
respective decisions, both courts cited certain attributes inherent to
digital media, such as the ability to retrieve individual articles
independent of the collective work as a whole and the secondary
market impact of such attributes, as among the principal bases for
their decisions.173 The digital re-publications at issue in Tasini and
Greenberg all reflected changes to the content of the original print
versions on which they were based.174 On the other hand, the cited
attributes and market impact ramifications remain an issue where
the subsequent version is an exact digital replica of the original.
Accordingly, an important question left open by Tasini and
Greenberg is whether a full-image, exact digital replica of a
collective work with no additions or deletions to the content of the
original print version qualifies as a § 201(c) revision.
As cogently argued by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Tasini,
the disqualification of a digital re-publication as a § 201(c) revision
solely on the basis of attributes unique and inherent to electronic
media formats contradicts the doctrine of media neutrality.175
exact digital replicas are not § 201(c) revisions. The basis for the publisher’s copyright is
his or her own creative contribution in arranging and editing the collective work.
Although a subsequent version of a collective work must reflect the publisher’s original
editorial contribution in order to qualify as a § 201(c) revision, the fact that it does so
does not end the § 201(c) analysis. In addition to the publisher’s creative contribution,
the subsequent version might contain other features and attributes inconsistent with the
purposes of § 201(c). See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 502 n.10. Thus, an exact digital replica will
obviously reproduce the publisher’s original editorial contributions, but does not revise or
update the work. Likewise, if a subsequent version of a collective work does not reflect
the editorial content of the original version, the original work has not been “revised,” but
rather an entirely new collective work has been assembled.
173
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497–500; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1269.
174
As discussed in Part I, the digital re-publications in Tasini were either content-altered
electronic versions or full-image compendiums of previously independent editions or
works. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 490–91. In Greenberg, previously independent issues were
collectively reproduced and combined with entirely new material on the NG-CD. See
Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1268–70.
175
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“No one doubts that the
New York Times has the right to reprint its issue in Braille . . . or in microform, even
though such revisions might look and feel quite different from the original. Such
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Although there were no “absolutely exact” digital replicas at issue
in Tasini, if the reasoning of the majority is taken to its logical
conclusion, Justice Stevens’ arguments prove quixotic. A printed
collective work that is updated to include a more recent article falls
squarely within § 201(c), so long as the updating is undertaken in
print.176 Under the reasoning of the Tasini majority, however, if
the updated version is produced in digital format, it would be
regarded as a new publication of its contributory works and
therefore disqualified as a revision.177
Although neither Tasini nor Greenberg actually decides the
issue, the two courts appear to have contradictory views of exact
digital replicas with respect to § 201(c). The Greenberg court
observed that if it were dealing only with the Replica portion of the
NG-CD, the fact that it is an exact digital replica of the original
printed back issues of National Geographic Magazine would seem
to preclude its characterization as a new work.178 The court also
considered, and ultimately rejected, the option of classifying the
Replica as a derivative work—“a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”179
The court concluded that “in order to qualify as a derivative work,
the resulting work . . . after transformation must qualify as an
‘original work of authorship.’ Thus, the mere electronic digital

differences, however, would largely result from the different medium being employed.
Similarly, the decision to convert the single collective work newspaper into a collection
of individual ASCII files can be explained as little more than a decision that reflects the
different nature of the electronic medium. . . . The bare-bones nature of ASCII text would
make trying to wade through a single ASCII file containing the entire content of a single
edition of the New York Times an exercise in frustration.”). While Justice Stevens’
concerns regarding the doctrine of media neutrality are compelling, recognizing that the
reproduction of a printed work into digital format does not result in the creation of a new
work does not lead to the conclusion that the digital result is a “revision.”
176
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2003).
177
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497–500.
178
See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272 (noting that the court was “[a]ssuming arguendo,
but expressly not deciding, that 201(c)’s revision privilege embraces the entirety of the
Replica portion of the [NG-CD]”).
179
Id. at 1274 n.14 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
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reproduction . . . may not qualify as a derivative work . . . .”180
Accordingly, the Greenberg court seemed prepared to grant exact
digital replicas § 201(c) revision status.
In contrast, certain rulings by the Supreme Court in Tasini cast
considerable doubt upon the eligibility of exact digital replicas for
sanctuary under § 201(c). For one thing, the Court ruled that the
New York Times’ GPO CD, a full-image replica product, did not
qualify as a § 201(c) revision.181 The ruling is not dispositive,
however, because the Court appears to have based its ruling in part
upon the fact that the GPO CD includes more than one edition of
the New York Times, as well as digital replicas of other periodicals,
all on a single disc.182 Accordingly, the Court understandably
considered this kind of compilation of independent collective
works as something other than a revision of each of the
independent collective works therein.183

180

Id.
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 500 (“One might view the articles as parts of new
compendium—namely, the entirety of works in the Database.”).
182
See id. at 499–502 n.11 (“The dissenting opinion apparently concludes that, under
the banner of ‘media-neutrality,’ a copy of a collective work, even when considerably
changed, must constitute a ‘revision’ of that collective work so long as the changes were
‘necessitated by . . . the medium.’ We lack the dissent’s confidence that the current form
of the Databases is entirely attributable to the nature of the electronic media, rather than
the nature of the economic market served by the Databases.” (citation omitted)).
183
For certain purposes, it might be appropriate to treat compilations of the same
periodical, for example, all editions of the New York Times for 1990, differently from a
compilation of different periodicals, say a compilation of all national newspapers
published in 1990. In any case, while neither a compendium or a compilation constitutes
a revision, other commentators have also questioned whether such versions should be
considered entirely new works. See Albert & Barzilay, supra note 56, at 17 (“Publishers
should . . . consider keeping the electronic versions of their publications as similar as
possible to their print format. . . . The language in Tasini suggests that this format would
qualify as a ‘revision’ of the original periodical issue, and thus the rights would belong to
the publisher, thereby defeating a Tasini-style claim by authors.”); Wendy Gordon, FineTuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution and Reproduction, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 473, 486 (2000) (“[I]t is hard to imagine that merely collecting several verbatim,
full-format issues of [various collective works] on a disk together . . . makes a new
‘version’ that exceeds the [§ 201(c)] privilege, any more than a library infringes a
copyright holder’s rights when it binds journal issues together in a hard-cover volume.”
(footnote omitted)). As discussed in Part III.D, however, while an exact digital replica
should not be regarded as a new work, it should not be considered a “revision” of the
original work.
181
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Nonetheless, even if each GPO CD contained no more than an
exact replica of only a single edition of the New York Times, it
does not follow that the Tasini majority would allow it as a §
201(c) revision.184 If the resulting electronic product is amenable
to Boolean searches and individual article retrieval, these attributes
would present the contributory articles outside the context of the
original collective work and would have an impermissible impact
on the “stand-alone” secondary market for such works.185
Consequently, it appears that the Tasini majority would regard an
exact digital replica as a new publication for the purposes of
applying § 201(c).186
C. Exact Digital Replicas Are Not § 201(c) Revisions
The issue of exact digital replicas crystallizes the tension
between the views of the majority and dissent in Tasini. It is
possible, however, to reconcile these competing views. Indeed,
they can be reconciled not only with respect to exact digital
replicas, but perhaps also with respect to most content-altered
digital re-publications as well. By basing the qualification of a
digital re-publication as a § 201(c) revision on the content of the
digital version, as opposed to its digital media attributes, the
conflict with the doctrine of media neutrality can be avoided.
D. What Constitutes a Revision?
There are a variety of changes that can be made to a printed
work that go beyond merely revising the work, but fall short of
creating an entirely new work or publication. Depending upon the
purpose and nature of the changes made to the original version of a
work, there are different kinds of versions that will result from
these changes.
In general, the label given to each resulting version also
signifies the purpose in undertaking the subsequent version.187 For
184

See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 503.
See id. at 497.
186
See id. at 502–04.
187
See, e.g., NAT G. BODIAN, BODIAN’S PUBLISHING DESK REFERENCE: A
COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES FOR BOOK AND JOURNAL
MARKETING AND BOOKSELLING 3 (1988) (defining abridgment as “[e]limination of
185
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example, when a work is translated into a different language, the
resulting version is referred to as a translation; when a new version
is undertaken in order to correct significant errors in the original,
the result is often referred to as an emendation; when the original
version of the work is streamlined to delete nonessential or
extraneous matter, the resulting version is sometimes referred to as
an abridgment.188 Indeed, in some cases, in order to properly
characterize the result of even a single change to the original
version, it might be necessary to know the specific purpose for the
change. The removal of material might be an emendation if the
material was included in error or an abridgement if the material is
subsequently considered non-essential to a particular audience or
market for the work.189
A revision is commonly understood as a purposeful alteration
of content undertaken for some substantive reason.190 Purely
cosmetic alterations, such as changing font size or designing a new
cover for a work, generally do not result in the production of a
substantive revision.191 Likewise where an exact replica of the

sections of a book, or the rewriting of the text in condensed form so as to make the text
desirable to a different audience, of to broaden the market for an expensive library work
to individuals by price reduction”).
188
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 4, 377, 1254 (10th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S] (defining abridgement as “a shortened form of a work
retaining the general sense and unity of the original”; defining emendation as “an
alteration designed to correct or improve” and which is usually “textual”; defining
translation as “a change to a different substance, form, or appearance: conversion”); see
also BODIAN, supra note 187, at 3.
189
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 186, at 377; BODIAN, supra note 187, at 3.
190
According to WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, to revise is “to alter something already
written or printed, in order to make corrections, improve or update.” RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1113 (2d ed. 1997); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S,
supra note 188, at 1005 (defining revision as an “alteration” or “mak[ing] a new,
amended, improved, or up-to-date version”).
191
See DAVID M. BROWNSTONE & IRENE M. FRANCK, THE DICTIONARY OF PUBLISHING
238 (1982) (defining revision as “1. The process of altering a body of written work; for
example, alterations made in a manuscript by its author at any stage of manuscript
preparation, alterations made in a published work in preparation for issuance of a new
edition, or alterations made in a contract being negotiated. 2. A new edition of a
previously published work, containing alterations amounting to more than corrections;
often including updating materials, as in a textbook or annual. Also called a revised
edition.”).
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original work is produced, the result is not a revision because
nothing has been “revised.”192
The reproduction of a printed work into a different medium
may result in any of the foregoing kinds of versions or even a new
work altogether, depending upon the nature of the changes to its
content that are undertaken in connection with its reproduction. To
label an exact digital replica of a printed work a “revision” is to
treat that term as being synonymous with the term “version” or
even “copy.” It seems more appropriate to characterize an exact
digital replica of a printed work as an “archive version” or an
“archive copy”—that is, a version or copy made for archival
purposes—as opposed to a substantive “revision” of the original
printed version or an entirely new work.193
Thus, while Tasini and Greenberg can be interpreted to stand
for the proposition that certain changes to a collective work will
render the result more than a mere revision of the original work,
common sense copyright as well as ordinary custom and usage
seem to dictate that where no changes are made to the content of
the original version, the subsequent version is not a revision
because the collective work has not actually been revised. Indeed,
exact digital replicas are particularly amenable to classification as
“archive versions,” as opposed to revisions or new works, because
in such cases the original work has not been revised or altered in
any substantive way.
192

See id.
The same reasoning applies to printed works reproduced and stored on microfilm.
Interestingly, however, each of the Tasini and Greenberg tribunals which compared the
various defendants’ digital re-publications to microfilm seemed to take for granted that
microfilm versions would qualify as revisions within § 201(c) and also in the ordinary
sense of the term. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 501–02 (2001);
Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1273 n.12 (11th Cir. 2001). None
of the courts explain, however, the basis for this assumption. At least one other
commentator has noted a contradiction in this reasoning. See Thornburg, supra note 2, at
245–46 (“It remains puzzling that while converting a year’s subscription to a magazine
into microfilm is protected under [§] 201(c), a series of digital reproductions of that same
year’s subscription burned onto a CD-ROM falls outside such protection when
accompanied by a simple computer program that allows for easy searching.”). In the
present author’s view, the characterization of full-image microfilm reproductions as §
201(c) revisions is incorrect. Full-image microfilm reproductions are merely copies
made for archival purposes, i.e., archive versions or archive copies.
193
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In addition to being an “un-revised” archive version or copy,
an exact digital replica can also be disqualified as a § 201(c)
revision in accordance with the reasoning of the Tasini majority.
As construed by the Supreme Court, the § 201(c) revision privilege
exists to allow for the revising and updating of a collective work
while preserving the commercial market for further publication of
the individual contributions therein.194 However, virtually any
revision of a previously published printed collective work, even a
traditional updating in print, will arguably have at least some
impact on the market for the individual contributions therein.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to refine the definition of an
impermissible market impact under § 201(c) to be that of a
negative impact that is significantly greater than that which is
likely to result from a traditional updating or revising of the
original collective work.
The content-altered digital re-publications in Tasini and
Greenberg were held to virtually extinguish any secondary market
for the contributory works contained therein, because once
available online, there would be little need for alternative access to
the works.195 An exact digital replica of a collective work,
particularly when disbursed into an online commercial database,
would likely have the same effect. Accordingly, exact digital
replicas can be disqualified from § 201(c) revision status on the
same market impact grounds as the content-altered digital republications at issue in Tasini.196

194
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 (“Essentially, § 201(c) adjusts a publisher’s copyright in
its collective work to accommodate a freelancer’s copyright in her contribution.”).
195
See id.; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1275. Both courts implicitly held that such
subsequent digital markets exist. The basis for this assumption is questioned in Part IV.
196
Professor Gordon advances still another argument as to why a full-image digital
replica does not qualify as a § 201(c) revision:
Even if . . . exact full-format digital reproductions fall within the statutory
privilege . . . infringement can still occur because freelancers have not only a
reproduction right, but also an exclusive right of distribution. . . . [R]egardless
of whether [the digital reproduction] infringes the copyright owner’s right of
reproduction, a publisher exceeds his privilege of distribution when he allows
individual articles to be downloaded because making an individual article
available for download is not distributing it as “part of” the whole.
Gordon, supra note 183, at 475 (footnote omitted).
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It would seem preferable, however, to disqualify exact digital
replicas as privileged revisions on the basis of their
characterization as archive versions. As a distinction based on
content, it avoids conflict with the doctrine of media neutrality.
Indeed, this distinction disqualifies all exact replicas from
characterization as revisions on the basis of their content regardless
of the medium in which they happen to be produced.
E. Treating Content-Altered Digital Re-Publications as Archive
Versions
The characterization of digital re-publications as archive
versions can also be used to reconcile the concerns of the majority
and dissent in Tasini with regard to content-altered digital republications. While deleting illustrations, photographs, or chapter
headings from a work would seem to be more than mere cosmetic
changes, depending upon the reason for and nature of such
changes, they might be more appropriately regarded as relating to
the archiving of the work, as opposed to the substantive revision of
the work.197
The changes to the content of the collective works in Tasini
were undertaken in connection with the efficient storage,
preservation, and further dissemination of previously published
material.198
Arguably, these changes, whether deleting
photographs or column layouts, or combining otherwise exact
digital replicas with other independent works on a single disc, are
not purposefully substantive, but rather incidental to the efficient
197
In its verb form, archive means “[t]o place or store in an archive; in Computing, to
transfer to a store containing infrequently used files, or to a lower level in the hierarchy
of memories esp[ecially] from disc to tape.” COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 69
(2d ed. 1991). In its noun form, an archive is “[a] place in which public records or other
important historic documents are kept. . . . [or a] historical record or document so
preserved.” Id. Merriam-Webster’s defines an archive as “a place in which public
records or historical documents are preserved.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 188, at
61.
198
Given the nature of electronic media, illustrations and photographs in print-to-digital
transfers can arguably defeat many of the objectives in transferring the work into digital
format. Whereas text can be economically archived in digital format, photographs and
illustrations take up enormous amounts of disc space. Thus, the deletion of such material
may not be “purposefully substantive” but rather, essential to efficient electronic
archiving. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 512–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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digital archiving of printed material.199 Such changes do not rise to
the level of substantive revisions and also fall short of creating
entirely new works. Once again it seems more accurate to
characterize the digital results as archive versions as opposed to
substantive revisions or new collective works. Moreover, just as
with exact digital replicas, the characterization of content-altered
digital replicas as archive versions permits their disqualification as
§ 201(c) revisions on the basis of their content, as opposed to on
the basis of characteristics unique and inherent to electronic
media.200
In sum, Tasini and Greenberg hold that digital re-publication
can effectively result in the “dismantling” of a collective work and
thereby constitute independent publications of the contributory
works therein, or the production of an entirely new collective
work.201 As discussed above, however, digital re-publication may
be more accurately described as resulting in the production of an
archive version or archive copy, depending upon the nature, extent,
and reasons for any changes made to the content of the original
version of the collective work. If limited changes have been made
to the original content primarily to take advantage of beneficial
attributes inherent to digital media, then the digital result should be
regarded as an archive version. If no changes have been made to
the content of the original version—that is, an exact digital replica
has been produced—the result should also be considered an
archive version or an archive copy. Moreover, the characterization
of digital re-publications as archive versions will generally lead to
the same results as those reached in Tasini and Greenberg in
applying § 201(c), but avoids conflict with the doctrine of media
neutrality.202
199

See id.
The NG-CD in Greenberg is disqualified as a § 201(c) revision for the same reasons.
While some of the changes made to the content of the original version, i.e., collecting all
of the back issues of National Geographic Magazine onto a single disc, may have been
undertaken for archival purposes, other changes, such as the creation and inclusion of the
Animation Sequence, went beyond archival necessities. See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1273.
Thus, the NG-CD might be both an archive version and a derivative work, but in any
case, more than a mere revision.
201
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 487; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1273.
202
There is, however, at least one situation under § 201(c) in which conflict with the
doctrine of media neutrality seems unavoidable, at least with respect to the Tasini market
200
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Thus, § 201(c) is of little value in addressing the problem of
digital re-publication. As discussed in the next section, however,
the fair use doctrine presents a more viable mechanism for
balancing the competing interests at issue in connection with the
digital use and dissemination of previously published copyrighted
works.
IV. DIGITAL RE-PUBLICATION AND THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
While § 201(c) offers a safe harbor for the unauthorized use of
a contributory work as part of a revision of a collective work, the
unauthorized use of any copyrighted work—contributory,
collective, or singular—may also be defended by resort to the fair
use doctrine.203 The fair use doctrine is an “equitable doctrine
[which] permits other people to use copyrighted material without
the owner’s consent in a reasonable manner for certain
purposes.”204 The fair use doctrine enables the copyright law to
impact rule. Where the collective work is updated in accordance with the express
provisions of the statute, such as when an article is added to the evening edition of a daily
newspaper, or a 1990 edition updates a 1980 encyclopedia, then under the reasoning of
the Tasini majority, if the updated version is produced in digital format, its market impact
potential precludes its qualification as a § 201(c) revision. Such a digital update could
not be characterized as an archive version, however, because there has been an alteration
in content for substantive as opposed to archival purposes. Ironically then, the very kind
of content (albeit perhaps not medium) change contemplated by Congress in revising
§ 201(c) becomes impermissible under the holding in Tasini. While this result is
consistent with the judicial construction of the legislative objective underlying § 201(c),
it does discriminate against electronic revisions in favor of print revisions.
203
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (“Fair use was traditionally defined as ‘a privilege in others
than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent.” . . . The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the
Copyright Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common law doctrine.”
(citations omitted)); Leval, supra note 106, at 1105 (“Not long after the creation of the
copyright law by the Statute of Anne of 1709, courts recognized that certain instances of
unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted material, first described as ‘fair abridgment,’
later ‘fair use,’ would not infringe the author’s rights. In the United States, the doctrine
was received and eventually incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976 . . . .”). An
example of a fair use of copyrighted material is a limited educational use, such as
copying and distributing a newspaper article for use as part of a classroom discussion.
204
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (1992); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574–77 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 448–51 (1984); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th
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account for those situations in which the social utilities to be
achieved in permitting a specific use of copyrighted material
warrant a limited impingement upon the copyright holder’s
exclusive property rights.205 The fair use doctrine is one of the
principal means by which the underlying policy objectives of the
copyright law are attained, including the broadest dissemination of
creative works toward the greater public good.206
As it would be unworkable to predetermine a list of all
circumstances in which the equitable social utilities outweigh the
copyright holder’s interest in denying or restricting the use of his
or her work, courts instead weigh four factors in evaluating
whether an unauthorized use should be permitted as a fair use.207

Cir. 1992); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir.
2001); Koenigsberg, supra note 112, at 147–48; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, §
13.05; Leval, supra note 106, at 1127 (“Fair use was a judge-made utilitarian limit on a
statutory right. It balances the social benefit of a transformative secondary use against
injury to the incentives of authorship.”).
205
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, § 10.2.1 (“At the highest level of generalization,
[fair] uses characteristically involve situations in which the social, political and cultural
benefits of the use will outweigh any consequent losses to the copyright proprietor, and in
which the time and expense of negotiations—or, in [certain cases], the unwillingness of
the copyright owner to permit these uses at an acceptable price—will often foreclose a
negotiated transaction.”); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 13.05[A][1].
206
See Samuelson, supra note 146, at 51 (“Fair use has historically served as a flexible
and adaptable mechanism for balancing the interests of copyright owners, their
competitors or potential competitors, and the public to fulfill the larger purposes of
copyright law which have traditionally been understood to be promoting the production
and dissemination of knowledge.”).
207
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 13.05[A] (“Strictly speaking, Section 107 does
not attempt to define ‘fair use.’ Rather, it lists ‘the factors to be considered’ for the
purpose of ‘determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use.’ It does not, and does not purport to, provide a rule that may automatically be
applied in deciding whether any particular use is ‘fair.’” (footnote omitted)); Anderson &
Brown, supra note 111, at 145–46, 159 (“Congress codified the copyright and fair use
case law in the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 107 of the Act governs fair use. The
preamble to [§] 107 lists several examples of what might be successful assertions of the
fair use defense. Drawing on prior case law, Congress enumerated four factors for
determining whether a use qualifies as a fair use. . . . In [these] limited circumstances, fair
use permits someone other than the author to [use] a copyrighted work without the
author’s permission.”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[]’[The] endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise
in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute’[]. The statutory
factors do, however, provide substantial guidance to courts undertaking the proper fact-
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These factors are (1) the purpose and the character of the use, such
as whether it is primarily commercial in nature or if it is a
transformative use—that is, a use that substantively enhances or
builds upon the copyrighted work; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work involved—that is, whether it is primarily a creative work
such as a fiction novel or a factual work such as a biography; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the work to be used without the
author’s permission; and (4) the effect that allowing the
unauthorized use is likely to have upon the market for the
copyrighted work.208 Properly applied, the four fair use factors
assist courts in insuring that the author’s incentive mechanism of
commercial gain through licensing exclusive rights does not
override or impede the copyright law’s primary goal of “increasing
society’s stock of knowledge.”209
A. Fair Use in Tasini and Greenberg
Considering the four fair use factors, pursuit of the § 201(c)
revision privilege might well seem the more viable defense
strategy to publishers in the position of the Tasini defendants. The
Tasini publishers were using the contributory works for
commercial gain, and the nature of digital re-publication required
specific inquiry.” (second citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66
(1976))).
208
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 560 (“The factors enumerated in the [statute] are not meant to be exclusive . . .
‘and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.’” (citation
omitted)); Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal.
2000); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T. Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1525 (D. Colo.
1995); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 104, § 10.2 (“[S]ince passage of the 1976 Act, courts
typically and systematically apply all four factors. Some courts apply additional
factors.”); Edwards, supra note 159, at 847–48 (“The § 107 fair use factors find their
roots in Justice Story’s now famous opinion in Folsom v. March, which courts frequently
cite as the first American case to recognize the doctrine. . . . [N]early one hundred thirtyfive years after the Folsom decision, in 1976, Congress adopted the § 107 fair use factors
employed by courts today, using Folsom as its guide.” (footnotes omitted)).
209
Hughes, supra note 109, at 295; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, at
13.05[A] (“[T]he factors contained in Section 107 are merely by way of example, and are
not exhaustive enumeration. This means that factors other than those enumerated may
prove to have a bearing upon the determination of fair use.”). For cases involving the
application of the fair use doctrine to unauthorized electronic use of copyrighted works,
including unauthorized dissemination on the Internet, see Mtima, supra note 33, at 317–
21.
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that the works be used in their entirety. Even the fact that many of
the copyrighted contributions were journalistic accounts of public
events would be of only limited benefit to the publishers, as the
courts have held that such works are not ipso facto vulnerable to
fair use.210 Finally, while the question of market impact is a
textured one,211 in light of the findings of the district court and the
Second Circuit with respect to that issue,212 it would seem prudent
to abandon fair use in favor of a § 201(c) defensive strategy.213
On the other hand, in Greenberg, National Geographic did
pursue a fair use defense in the trial court and before the Eleventh
Circuit.214 Although the Eleventh Circuit did not employ a pointby-point analysis of the four fair use factors, its ultimate rejection
of National Geographic’s fair use defense is consistent with
traditional fair use analysis.215
With respect to the first fair use factor, there was no dispute
that National Geographic’s use of Greenberg’s photograph was for
commercial profit.216 Moreover, the photograph was not merely
reproduced in the challenged electronic publication, but was
actually morphed into a part of the Animation Sequence, a use the
court easily concluded resulted in the unauthorized creation of a
derivative work:

210

See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555–58.
As discussed in Part IV.C, defining the “digital re-publication market” for
contributions to collective works may not be as straightforward a task as it might first
appear.
212
Notwithstanding the fact that the district court ruled that Congress had not
envisioned the development of digital re-publication markets on behalf of contributory
authors, both courts found that the publishers’ activities were likely to have a detrimental
impact on such secondary commercial exploitation opportunities. See Tasini v. N.Y.
Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 826–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and remanded, 206 F.3d
161 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); cf. Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 206 F. 3d.
161, 170 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Time subsequently licensed Whitford’s article to Mead without
notifying, obtaining authorization from, or compensating, him.”), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483
(2001).
213
As discussed in Part IV.C, however, the Tasini defendants may have abandoned the
fair use defense prematurely.
214
See Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001).
215
See id. at 1274–75.
216
See id. at 1275.
211
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The Society has selected ten preexisting works,
photographs included in covers of ten issues of the
Magazine . . . and transformed them into a moving visual
sequence that morphs one into the other over a span of
approximately 25 seconds. . . . The use of [Greenberg’s]
photograph far transcended a mere reprinting or borrowing
of the work. . . . [I]t became an integral part of a larger,
new collective work. . . . The [Animation] Sequence also
integrates the visual presentation with an audio presentation
consisting of copyrightable music. The resultant moving
and morphing visual creation transcends a use that is fair
within the context of § 107.217
Regarding the second and third fair use factors, the photograph
was an artistic creative work, and the work was used in its
entirety.218 Each of these attributes generally militates against
allowing the challenged use as a fair use.219
Finally, with respect to the fourth fair use factor, the court
concluded that National Geographic’s use would have a negative
impact on the subsequent commercial market for Greenberg’s
photograph.220 Although the court did not cite to any specific
facts, it expressly held that “the inclusion of Greenberg’s diver
photograph in the [Animation] Sequence has effectively
217

Id. at 1274–75. The creation of a derivative work is a separate exclusive right. See
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003).
218
Cf. id. at 1269 (“One of the cover images used in the moving covers sequence is a
picture of a diver that was taken by Greenberg in 1961.”).
219
See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) (“We next consider the second
factor, ‘the nature of the copyrighted work.’ This factor focuses attention on the extent to
which a work falls at the core of creative expression. Thus, for example, a fictional work
might be closer to the core of copyright than a factual work.” (citations omitted)); Sega
Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992); SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The second factor, the
nature of the copyrighted work, recognizes that there is a hierarchy of copyright
protection in which original, creative works are afforded greater protection than
derivative works or factual compilations.”); Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165, *39 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Regarding the second factor, ‘the nature
of the copyrighted work,’ the published creative sound recordings copied are ‘close to the
core of intended copyright protection,’ and, conversely, far removed from the more
factual or descriptive type of work that is more amenable to fair use.”); Los Angeles
Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, *54–*60 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
220
See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1275.
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diminished, if not extinguished, any opportunity Greenberg might
have had to license the photograph to other potential users.”221
Consequently, consistent with the four fair use factors, the court
ruled that National Geographic’s use did not qualify as a fair
use.222
B. Reevaluating Digital Re-Publication Market Impact as a
Question of Fair Use
In reviewing the Tasini and Greenberg decisions, it is difficult
to extract a rule for applying the four fair use factors to
unauthorized digital re-publication, especially with respect to the
market impact factor. As discussed above, the Greenberg fair use
analysis was somewhat limited, particularly in its market impact
assessment.223 While the Supreme Court’s market impact analysis
in Tasini is much more detailed, that analysis was undertaken
within the context of § 201(c).224 Accordingly, the nature and
extent of negative market impact resulting from an unauthorized
digital re-publication that might be allowable as a fair use is
unclear.
Initially, it might seem feasible to utilize the finding of
impermissible market impact by the Supreme Court in Tasini to
buttress the Greenberg fair use/market impact analysis. The flaw
in such an approach, however, is that it fails to distinguish between
the role of market impact analysis under § 201(c) and its purpose
in applying the fair use doctrine. Given the differing policy
objectives that underlie the revision privilege and the fair use
doctrine, there may be a level of market impact resulting from an
unauthorized use that is unacceptable under § 201, but nonetheless
allowable under § 107.225
221

Id. at 1275. Thus the court seems to presume both the likelihood of further demand
for the photograph, as well as a devastating impact on such demand.
222
See id. at 1274–75.
223
See id. at 1275.
224
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496–97 (2001).
225
Thus the commentators that have interpreted Tasini to foreclose the fair use defense
in digital re-publication cases may be premature in their concern. See, e.g., Snyder, supra
note 67, at 365–66 (“While authors and publishers squared off in [Tasini], the public sat
on the sidelines. The protection of public access went out the window in Tasini with
serious consequences. Librarians, researchers and archivists were forced to remove
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As construed by the courts in Tasini and Greenberg, the proper
application of § 201(c) balances the right of a contributing author
to receive a commercial return for his or her creative endeavors
against the interest of the publisher who arranged the collective
work in undertaking—and coincidentally profiting from—
appropriate revisions of that work.226 Congress has determined
that the publisher’s interest in revising a collective work justifies a
limited impingement upon the contributing author’s pecuniary
rights.227 The Tasini and Greenberg courts have clarified,
however, that the § 201(c) incursion upon the contributing author’s
exclusive rights is not available for all revisions, but is limited to
those revisions that, inter alia, do not unduly burden the secondary
market for contributory works.228 This delineation is necessary to
thousands of newspaper and magazine freelance articles from public access after the
decisions by the Second Circuit and the United States Supreme Court. . . . By taking the
side of authors, the Supreme Court rejected the policy of distribution efficiency and
reached a narrow decision that ignored the broad harms to the authors, publishers and
public.” (footnotes omitted)). Of course, the possibility of differing outcomes under
§ 201(c) and § 107 does not turn solely upon the issue of market impact. An
unauthorized re-publication of a collective work which involves changes beyond those
permitted by § 201(c) might also fail to satisfy the first three fair use factors, even though
the re-publication may have little or no impact on the secondary market for the
contributory works therein.
226
There is also a public interest in having collective works properly updated, which
provides the impetus for granting publishers the revision privilege. See, e.g., John D.
Shuff & Geoffrey T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in a Digital Age, 34 AKRON L. REV. 555,
556–57 (2001) (“The publisher’s interests are in some ways aligned with and in other
ways adverse to, both the author’s and the public’s. Like the author, the publisher seeks
to profit from the sale of the copyrighted works, and thus seeks to limit the means by
which the public may consume these works without paying a price. However, like the
public, the publisher does not want the author’s rights to be so broad that the publisher’s
ability to reproduce and distribute copyrighted works—and therefore its profitearning
capability—is hindered. In a legal dispute, a publisher . . . will thus note the
constitutional rationalization of the profit motive, but if the author’s and the publisher’s
interests collide, the latter will likely throw in a ‘value-added’ theory of economic
analysis that emphasizes dissemination over creation of works and justifies occasionally
stepping on the author’s toes in the name of efficient distribution of the fruits of ‘Science
and Useful Arts.’”).
227
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2002).
228
See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497; Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272–73, 1275. Thus, the
Supreme Court has construed that Congress intended to balance the public interest in
updated collective works against the copyright holder’s pecuniary interests by limiting
the revision privilege to revisions that do not devastate the copyright holder’s secondary
market opportunities.
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insure that the publisher’s privilege to revise and update a
collective work is not transmogrified into a usurpation of all postpublication exploitation opportunities for contributory works.229
In evaluating fair use claim, however, the interests of the
unauthorized revising publisher, particularly those of individual
commercial gain, are all but eliminated from the balancing
equation—if not weighed against allowing the use.230 Instead, the
salient interests at stake are those of the public with respect to the
social utility of creative works versus the compensation
expectations of the author.231 Given the primacy of the public
interest, however,232 it is conceivable that the interjection of that
interest could tip the balance in favor of permitting a detrimental
impact upon the copyright holder’s commercial interests,
notwithstanding the fact that such detrimental impact would be
considered unacceptable in applying § 201(c).233
229

See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497.
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Knowing exploitation of a
copyrighted work for personal gain militates against a finding of fair use.”).
231
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“[T]he limited grant [of exclusive rights to authors] is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access
to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”);
Samuelson, supra note 146, at 56–57 (“Courts have often relied upon fair use to resolve
disputes when recognition of broad rights in publishers or authors would have frustrated
achievement of the societal purposes of copyright law. In the American tradition, the
ultimate purpose of copyright is not the maximization of financial rewards to copyright
owners . . . but fostering the creation and dissemination of literary and artistic works in
order to enhance the public’s access to knowledge. The grant of exclusive rights to
authors enabling them to reap a portion of the value derived from their creative
contributions is a means to this larger end.” (footnotes omitted)).
232
See Appel, supra note 119, at 174–75 (“The ultimate purpose of American copyright
law is plainly stated in the Constitution. The law exists ‘to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts’ or, in plain, contemporary English, to promote the
advancement of society at large. While the same clause . . . also grants to authors of
creative works the right to enjoy the financial fruits of their labors, the plain language of
the clause evidences that this grant of monopoly is subservient to the primary goal of
promoting the progress of society as a whole. The Patent and Copyright Clause thus
reflects a tension between the right of the public to have access to creative works and the
right of authors of creative works to benefit financially from their efforts. The plain
language of the clause, however, resolves this tension in favor of the public.”).
233
See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The challenge of copyright is to strike the ‘difficult balance
230
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C. Revisiting Application of the Fair Use Factors to Tasini
In light of the foregoing, it is possible that some of the
unauthorized digital re-publications in Tasini might be permitted
under the fair use doctrine, notwithstanding their disqualification
as privileged revisions under § 201(c).234 Under the first factor,
notwithstanding the publishers’ commercial objectives, there is
also a compelling public interest in digital archiving and
dissemination that could outweigh the contributing copyright
holder’s ancillary commercial interests.235 Despite the importance
between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free
flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.’” (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at
429); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“The Copyright Clause was intended ‘to be the engine of free expression.’ . . . To that
end, copyright laws have been enacted to achieve the three main goals: the promotion of
learning, the protection of the public domain, and the granting of an exclusive right to the
author.” (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558); see also Francesco Parisi & Catherine
Sevcenko, Lessons from the Anticommons: The Economics of New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, 90 KY. L.J. 295, 309 (2001/2002) (“Copyright is essentially an attempt to capture
the benefit that the public derives from a creative literary work . . . and to return that
benefit to the author as a way to maintain an incentive for people to make cultural
contributions. It is not designed to guarantee the highest remuneration to authors, but is
rather a mechanism for balancing between the need for broad public availability of art,
literature, and music and finding a way to create incentives for people to produce those
goods.” (footnotes omitted)).
234
Leval, supra note 106, at 1125 (“Not every type of market impairment opposes fair
use.”).
235
Ho, supra note 152, at 1573 (“The legal nuances attendant to fair uses in teaching
and research are far more complex. Court precedents have banished simplistic
assumptions, such as the mythic fair use assumption that all commercial use is
impermissible.”); Koons, 960 F.2d at 309 (“The first factor . . . asks whether the [work
was used] in good faith to benefit the public or primarily for the commercial interests of
the infringer.”); Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, *41
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (“In addition to examining defendants’ purpose in copying plaintiffs’
articles, the first fair use factor also directs that the court evaluate the ‘character’ of the
use. The mere fact that a use is commercial does not ‘give rise to a presumption of
unfairness.’ Rather, a defendant’s commercial purpose is only ‘a separate factor that
tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.’” (citations omitted)); see also Rose, supra
note 119, at 110–11 (“Copyright law can reward authors with certain exclusive rights to
information placed on the Internet, but cannot enforce these rights to the exclusion of
equal access. The Web facilitates global communication. Global communication in turn
enhances global knowledge. Having a broad base of technological expertise strengthens
the United States both socially and economically. Thus, to remain true to the
Constitution, intellectual property law must harmonize itself with the moral obligation of
public schools and libraries to provide uniform access to digital information.”); Parisi &
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of the author’s remunerative rights, ensuring digital dissemination
of previously published printed works provides a vital public
benefit.236
Sevcenko, supra note 233, at 295 (“The [Tasini] case . . . attracted media attention . . .
because it appeared to pit the rights of authors to protect their creative works against the
nation’s need to preserve its historical record.”); see generally Carla D. Pratt, Should
Klansmen Be Lawyers? Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 857, 874 (2003) (“Communitarianism is perhaps the most rational
mechanism for reconciling the competing interests of civil liberties and civil rights.
Communitarians believe that, in a rights-based society, rights have limits as well as
concomitant responsibilities. Underlying the theory of communitarianism is the idea that,
as members of a community, we are morally obligated to undertake certain
responsibilities, and that these responsibilities may exist without an imminent payback in
the form of rights. In other words, communitarianists recognize that individual rights
cannot be absolute, but must be tempered by that which is in the best interest of the
community.” (footnotes omitted)).
236
See Joanne Benoit Nakos, An Analysis of the Effect of New Technology on the Rights
Conveyed by Copyright License Agreements, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 433, 459–60 (1995)
(“Exploitation of old works through new technology has the potential for such
profitability that media industries are not likely to find the possible threat of infringement
litigation a deterrent. Pursuant to the goals of copyright policy, such industries should be
facilitated in their legitimately licensed use of classic works . . . . [However, i]t is
extremely difficult for organizations with the ability to exploit classic works through the
‘information superhighway’ to search out outstanding copyright licenses, especially
considering the number of works that may constitute components of the final
transmission. In addition, these organization must secure their own license for this new
use, the rights to which were, in all likelihood, not contemplated by any preexisting
license.”); Snyder, supra note 67, at 377 (“Opponents have said publishers should not
receive the windfall from these new income sources. However, this income is just as
much of a windfall for the writer who fifteen years ago could have had no real
expectation that his article would produce income from an internet or CD-ROM database.
When income is not earned or reasonably expected by an author, the windfall should be
given to publishers or distributors to encourage greater availability of works to the
public.” (footnotes omitted)); Colby B. Springer, Ownership of Electronic Publishing
Rights in Collective Works: New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 341, 341 (2002) (“[The Tasini decision] represents a potentially
colossal financial windfall for freelance authors, while throwing a time consuming and
costly wrench into the gears of the multi-million dollar business that is on-line periodical
storage and retrieval.”). These considerations also render unauthorized digital republication closer in nature to the unauthorized uses at issue in Sony, 464 U.S. at 423,
and Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia System Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1073–75 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding denial of preliminary injunctions against
a company that produced portable music players that could play music downloaded from
the internet), than to the unauthorized uses in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In Tasini, Sony, and Diamond, the primary purpose
and benefit of each unauthorized use is arguably that of space-shifting and/or archiving,
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If NEXIS or some similar online database has become the
predominant digital archive for previously published material, the
public interest in complete digital libraries, when weighed against
the transaction costs in locating and negotiating with every
contributing author, seems to tip the balance in favor of allowing
digital re-publication as a fair use.237 Accepting the alternative—
conceding absolute dominion over digital re-publication to
individual freelance authors—could impede the ultimate objectives
of the copyright law.238
whereas the primary purpose of the unauthorized uses in Napster and MP3.com is that of
distribution, with a concomitant impact upon the commercial market for the copyrighted
works. See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. Although digital re-publication also has
distribution characteristics, as discussed below, the absence of a genuine electronic
publication market for individual contributory works, combined with the public benefit
derived from digital re-publication, distinguishes digital re-publication from unauthorized
peer-to-peer online music distribution for the purpose of assessing fair use.
237
See Garon, supra note 121, at 1350–51 (“The Internet will replace the paper file and
the fax as the document repository and transfer mechanism. Offices will not be
paperless, but most official files will be stored in digital archives.”); Thornburg, supra
note 2, at 247 (“Publishers argue that their development of new electronic formats serves
the public good in providing access through the Internet as well as other formats, like
CD-ROMs and databases. Creating a variety of both traditional and electronic
formats . . . allows greater access and ability to search for information, which directly
aids academics, researchers, and students. Furthermore, unlike traditional formats that
are bulky, the development of alternative electronic media has allowed for the ease of
storage and greater ability to retrieve such information. Both computer databases and
CD-ROMs serve the same public function as regular print periodicals, as these are all
sources of information selected and arranged to form valuable compilations by
publishers.” (footnotes omitted)). The problem of locating freelance authors, however,
could stymie this technological evolution. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,
519 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he difficulties of locating individual freelance authors
and the potential of exposure to statutory damages may well have the effect of forcing
electronic archives to purge freelance pieces from their databases. ‘The omission of these
materials from electronic collections . . . undermines the principal benefits that electronic
archives offer historians – efficiency, accuracy and comprehensiveness.’” (footnote and
citation omitted)); Parisi & Sevcenko, supra note 233, at 297, 300 (“[The Tasini case] is,
from the law and economic perspective, a classic anticommons situation in which
asymmetric transaction costs are complicating the implementation of the easiest solution:
some form of retroactive compensation to the authors for use of their work. . . . [T]he
core of the problem is that the New York Times does not have an easy way to track down
the freelancers who contributed to the paper over the last ten to fifteen years and
renegotiate the terms of the article with each of them.”).
238
See Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in the Contemporary Information Economy, 8
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 145 (2002) (hereinafter Nimmer, Licensing) (“A person who
controls information may elect not to distribute the information . . . . Unless mandatory
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With regard to the second fair use factor, because the
contributory works in Tasini were primarily journalistic accounts
of factual events, the balance tends to weigh in favor of allowing
the use.239 Further, given the nature and purpose of digital republication, it is necessary that the entire work be used, and hence
the third factor is not afforded the same weight as in cases in which
the relevant social utilities can be achieved by allowing only a
partial use of the work.240
Finally, in so far as the fourth fair use factor is concerned,
notwithstanding the findings in Tasini and Greenberg, the
disclosure laws govern, the law protects that decision.”); Jaszi, supra note 130, at 300
(“Copyright is changing or is in the process of changing. . . . [A]s things stand now, the
network environment is at risk of being swept up in a general restructuring of American
copyright law which has been taking place, . . . over the past few years. This process, to
begin with, had little if anything to do with new information technology, but it now
threatens to prevent that technology from achieving its full cultural and economic
potential.”); Parisi & Sevcenko, supra note 233, at 310–11 (“In an anticommons
situation, multiple owners have veto powers over the use of a resource, thereby
increasing the chances that it will not be used. Competition among the owners prompts
exercise of exclusion rights, even if one party could use the resource to create social
benefits. . . . The anticommons application in Tasini is clear: each of the authors now
retains control over the copyright to the work that was published in the New York Times.
The paper is currently either unwilling, or unable, to negotiate with each one of these
writers for the rights, so that the information they have provided will no longer be readily
available in electronic format. An important resource, therefore, will be underutilized,
given the growing reliance that people are placing on immediate electronic access to
information.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Springer, supra note 236, at 351–52 (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s decision in [Tasini] may very well punch holes in the fabric of history,
as electronic databases are the apparent future of our literary archives. Not only do these
databases provide a streamlined approach to research, and an easily accessible medium in
which authors may promote their works, electronic databases also provide a safe and
economical means by which to archive literary works. Electronic databases, while
unlikely to replace print libraries altogether, are quickly becoming more comprehensive
than their paper-bound brethren. The Tasini decision may only curtail this progress.”).
239
See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310 (“Where the original work is factual rather than fictional
the scope of fair use is broader.”); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Anderson & Brown, supra note 111, at 168–
69; Edwards, supra note 159, at 849; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 501 (1991) [hereinafter Jaszi,
Toward a Theory of Copyright] (“[I]n light of the Romantic ‘authorship’ construct, with
its implicit recognition of a hierarchy of artistic productions . . . art contains greater value
if it results from true imagination rather than mere application, particularly if its creator
draws inspiration directly from nature.”).
240
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586–89 (1994); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984).
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existence or extent of stand-alone digital re-publication markets241
for individual contributory works remains debatable. Prior to the
development and proliferation of digital information technology,
the market for re-publication of contributory works was limited,242
with the possible exception of the demand for works of famous
authors and freelance writers. The advent of digital information
technology, however, does not create any actual new demand for
individual contributory works. As Justice Stevens argued in his
dissent in Tasini, the advent of digital databases has created a new
market for the digital re-publication of complete archives of wellknown periodical publications and similar collective works:
[E]ven if one accepts the . . . characterization of the
Electronic Databases as collections of freestanding articles,
demand for databases like NEXIS probably does not reflect
a “demand for a freelance article standing alone[]” . . . .
Instead, it seems far more likely that the demand for the
Electronic Databases reflects demand for a product that will
provide a user with the means to quickly search through
scores of complete periodicals. . . .
Users . . . do not go to NEXIS because it contains a score of
individual articles by Jonathan Tasini. Rather, they go to
NEXIS because it contains a comprehensive and easily
searchable collection of (intact) periodicals.
(“The
efficiency, accuracy, reliability, comprehensiveness and
immediacy of access offered by searchable full-text digital
archives are but a few of the benefits historians and other
researchers have reaped from the advancement in the
technology of information”).243
241

See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 (“If there is a demand for a freelance article standing
alone or in a new collection, the Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit from that
demand . . . (‘when an author produces a work which later commands a higher price in
the market than the original bargain provided, the copyright statute . . . is designed to
provide the author the power to negotiate for the realized value of the work’) . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
242
See Shuff & Holtz, supra note 226, at 559.
243
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 522–24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Parisi & Sevcenko,
supra note 233, at 311–12 (“A database’s worth . . . lies in the fact that it is
comprehensive. Writers would know this and therefore demand premium licensing
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It is likely that few if any of the contributory articles in many
popular collective works have any digital re-publication market
beyond their role in making a digital archive complete.244 A
reasonable argument can be made that in the case of an online
database such as NEXIS, the objective is not to re-publish the
individual articles found within collective works, but rather, to
compile digital archives of collective works that are complete,
without regard to whatever specific contributory articles the
digitized collective works might happen to contain.245
If there is no genuine stand-alone market for digital republication of certain contributory articles, then the fourth fair use
factor weighs in favor of allowing digital re-publication of those
articles as part of the collective works in which they appear, lest
the public interest in digital archives be denied to preserve an
illusory interest on the part of freelance copyright holders.
Under [the fourth factor] a balance must be struck between
the benefit gained by the copyright owner when the [use] is
found [to be] an unfair use and the benefit gained by the
compensation, knowing that electronic database services . . . would have to comply in
order to maintain their market value.”).
244
Indeed, disallowing digital re-publication/archiving seems more likely to deprive the
public of electronic access to freelance contributory works than it is to force the issue of
royalties for freelance writers. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 67, at 378 (“After Tasini,
authors will possess less bargaining power. Publishers will be cautious of buying stories
in which they have only limited rights since new technology for information distribution
constantly develops. Publishers will likely ask for a prospective author to sign all of his
rights away, leaving him with the same amount of rights enjoyed in the early part of the
last century: none.”); Andrew Albanese, Despite Discord, Aggregators Remain Upbeat
After Tasini, LIBR. J., Aug. 1, 2001, at 14 (“‘The Times’s action creates the blacklist of
the Internet age,’ [Jonathan] Tasini said. ‘. . . No one who tries to enforce the Supreme
Court’s decision will be able to write for the Times ever again. That’s a blacklist.’”);
Reed, supra note 56, at 1089–90 (“Publishers . . . see [Tasini as] creating a lose-lose
scenario for all parties. In order to stop the infringement, the publishers are removing
those writers’ articles from the electronic databases, thereby taking those writers’ works
out of the public eye and also weakening the integrity of those databases as complete
records. The alternative is to go back through twenty years of articles, identify all of the
freelancer articles, contact the writers and have them all sign copyright transfers, a task
that many see as simply impossible to complete in any thorough fashion.”).
245
Thus, an electronic archive of “random freelance articles previously published in The
New York Times,” or for that matter, “all staff-written articles previously published in The
New York Times” is of limited value. The value of any database stems from the fact that
it is comprehensive and complete, whatever its specific content.
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public when the use is held to be fair. The less adverse
impact on the owner, the less public benefit need be shown
to sustain non-commercial fair use. It is plain that where a
use has no demonstrable impact on a copyright owner[‘s]
potential market, the use need not be prohibited to protect
the artist’s incentive to pursue his inventive skills.246
As an equitable doctrine, fair use has yet to be definitively
explored in the digital information context.247 Given the important
public interest at stake and the significance of market impact as a
fair use factor,248 genuine market impact in connection with
unauthorized digital re-publication should be concretely
established. Regardless of whether dispersing contributory works
into a digital database results in their individual re-publication and
distribution or merely a digital archive version of the original
collective work, there in fact may be little or no digital market for
the contributory works on a stand-alone basis, and therefore no
246

Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311–12 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Greenberg v. Nat’l
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1272 (stating that the absence of any genuine standalone secondary digital market may also militate against finding in favor of contributory
authors under § 201. However, given the nature of the competing interests at issue under
§ 201—i.e., publisher versus Author—any doubts as to the extent of such stand-alone
markets should be resolved in favor of the copyright holders. “[T]he [copyright] statute’s
language contrasts the contributor’s ‘copyright’ and ‘any rights under it’ with the
publisher’s ‘privilege.’ This is an important distinction that militates in favor of narrowly
construing the publisher’s privilege when balancing it against the constitutionally-secured
rights of the author/contributor.”).
247
See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985) (“‘[Since] the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable
definition is possible, and each case raising the question [of fair use] must be decided on
its own facts.’” (citation omitted)); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984) (“[S]ection [107] identifies various factors that enable a
court to apply an ‘equitable rule of reason’ analysis to particular claims of
infringement.”); Samuelson, supra note 146. As discussed above, a key policy issue is
determining the most propitious application for the revenues derived from digital republication. Arguably if such revenues are directed toward the publishers, it will likely
insure digital re-publication, in that publishers have control over and access to the entire
content of the original collective works. If the revenue is directed to the contributing
authors, it may enhance authors’ exclusive rights and further support the objectives
underlying § 201, but it may not prove an effective means by which to assure digital
archiving, given the transaction costs in locating and obtaining permission from each
author.
248
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).

MTIMA FORMAT

2004]

3/31/2004 4:21 PM

TASINI AND ITS PROGENY

443

genuine issue of negative market impact for purposes of fair use.
Thus, notwithstanding the decision in Greenberg249 or the findings
in Tasini, fair use remains a viable defense for many unauthorized,
collective-work digital re-publications.250
V. DIGITAL RE-PUBLICATION, PUBLISHING TRADE PRACTICES,
AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT
In Parts III and IV, the legitimacy of unauthorized digital republication was analyzed in the context of copyright infringement
249

See Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1267. The situation in Greenberg remains distinguishable.
Whatever the public interest in the digital production of the National Geographic Replica
(arguably an archive version), there does not appear to be any compelling public interest
in the unauthorized use of Greenberg’s photograph, an artistic work, in the production of
the Animation Sequence, a new and derivative work. Thus, even without exhaustive
evidence of negative market impact, the balance weighs in favor of disallowing the
unauthorized use.
250
See Jaszi, supra note 130, at 300–01 (“[C]opyright should operate to assure the
existence of a robust, constantly replenished public domain—an informational commons
on which we are all free to draw in our research and teaching, and for our various creative
projects. Accordingly, the special structures of copyright doctrine which exist to assure a
reasonable level of public access even where copyrighted works are concerned, such as
the doctrine of fair use, should be preserved and nurtured.” (footnotes omitted)); Parisi &
Sevcenko, supra note 233, at 323 (“The tragedy of the anticommons demonstrates that
fair use remains valuable even in the digital context of automated rights management. . . .
In light of the anticommons insight, fair use doctrine retains a valid efficiency
justification even in a zero transaction cost environment. Fair use defenses can be
regarded as justifiable and instrumental in minimizing the welfare losses occasioned by
the strategic behavior of the copyright holders.” (footnotes omitted)); Samuelson, supra
note 146, at 116 (“When enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress expressed an
expectation that the fair-use doctrine would—and should—evolve to deal with
challenging questions concerning the application of copyright law posed by new
technologies. . . . The strict property-rights view of copyright . . . was rejected by the
Court, which instead seemed to view copyright law as more of a regulatory regime aimed
at achieving a balance among the interests of copyright owners, the consuming public and
other commercial participants in the marketplace, such that the rights granted to authors
under the statute should be construed as reaching no further than Congress has intended
to achieve this balance.”); Shuff & Holtz, supra note 226, at 566 (“The question remains
of how best to ensure that the vast library of individual articles that have been published
remains available to the public while the rights of the authors of these articles is [sic]
respected. After all, if distribution of these articles is halted altogether, the authors will
enjoy no benefit, and the public will certainly suffer. Is requiring prior permission from
each author feasible? . . . The transaction costs of obtaining such [permission] could
outweigh the technological advances that have allowed millions of such articles to be
made available and economically sold on an individual basis in the first place.”).
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defenses that permit the use of copyrighted material without the
copyright holder’s consent. In many cases, however, there may be
a legitimate dispute as to whether the user has a contractual right to
make use of the subject work in electronic media.251 In such cases,
it will be necessary to scrutinize the terms of any agreements
between the parties, in order to determine whether the copyright
holder has licensed digital re-publication and other electronic
media use of his or her work.
A. Licensing Electronic Use, Establishing Electronic Infringement
Although the copyright law bestows the exclusive rights upon
the author of the copyrighted work, § 201 of the Copyright Act
provides that “[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, including any subdivision of the rights specified by
section 106, may be transferred . . . and owned separately.”252 In
addition, § 204 requires that assignments and transfers be made in
writing.253 Thus, the copyright holder is free to transfer or license
some, all, or any part of his or her exclusive rights, by executing an
appropriate license agreement.254
Unfortunately, participants in the publishing industry typically
do not effectuate or memorialize their copyright licenses and
agreements in terms that mirror the enumeration of exclusive rights
in § 106, or for that matter, through contractual mechanisms that
ostensibly comply with § 201.255 License agreements between
publishers and authors are often quite informal, indeed even

251

See, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
252
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2002); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, §§ 10.01, 10.02.
253
See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). “A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation
of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the
transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s
duly authorized agent.” See id.
254
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
255
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors as “Licensors” of “Informational Rights”
Under U.C.C. Article 2B, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 949–54 (1998); Santelli, supra
note 7, at 278; Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don’t Put My Article Online!:
Extending Copyright’s New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and
Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 906 (1995).
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oral.256 And even when in writing, standard publishing agreements
typically reference terms and rights that have specific and
significant meanings in the publishing trade, such as the right to
“publish” or to “print” a work, but which are not set forth as
exclusive rights in the copyright statute, such as the right to
reproduce, distribute, and prepare derivative versions of a
copyrighted work.257
Given some of the licensing jargon in the publishing trade,
even in those instances in which the parties intend to license a
particular kind of conduct or even specific exclusive rights, it is not
256

See generally Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir.
2001); Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and
remanded, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Mellencamp v. Riva
Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154, 1161–67 (S.D.N.Y 1988) Ginsburg, supra note 253, at
954 n.41; Matthew Hoff, Tasini v. New York Times: What the Second Circuit Didn’t
Say, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 125, 128 (1999) (stating that “publishers . . . once
accepted a freelance author’s work on little more than a handshake”); Rosenzweig, supra
note 255, at 905–06 (“Although publishers ordinarily have the rights to use preexisting
content produced by their staff writers under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, the usage
of works by freelancers is subject solely to interpretation of the underlying contract
between the two parties. Historically, however, parties have been lax in creating written,
let alone unambiguous, contracts. Until recently, magazines and newspapers bought
articles ‘simply on the basis of oral agreements,’ and the freelance contracts that did exist
did not expressly address the parties’ rights in electronic media.” (footnotes omitted)).
257
See, e.g., Reed, supra note 56, at 1106–08 (“An ‘all-rights’ contract does what it
says; it transfers to the publisher every possible right the author may have in her
work. . . . [By contrast t]he book publishing industry [also] recognizes the concept of
‘Primary Rights,’ which, in the United States, generally entails the exclusive right to
publish a work in print in English throughout North America (or even worldwide). The
analogous right in the periodical publishing industry may be the ‘first publication rights,’
which give the periodical publisher the right to publish the work in their publication
before it is published elsewhere. . . . Subsidiary Rights are the rights that are not Primary
Rights. As evidenced in Random House, obtaining the Primary Rights to publish a book
in print does not necessarily include the right to publish that book electronically.”). In
addition to the foregoing categories, other “rights” recognized in the publishing industry,
but not individually enumerated in the copyright statute, include Serial Rights, Reprint
Rights, Braille Rights, Audio Rights, Foreign Language Rights, Anthology Rights, and
Book Club Rights. See id. at 1108; see also Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1387 (1st
Cir. 1993); Nakos, supra note 236, at 433–49; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, §
26.02; Thornburg, supra note 2, at 251; cf. generally Tele-pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570
N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that broadcast rights for motion pictures do
not confer rights to distribute videocassettes); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845
F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 150–53
(2d Cir. 1968) (upholding dismissal of the copyright holder’s claim against the assignee
of rights to the motion picture which licensed the movie rights for television).
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always apparent from the express terms of the parties’ contract
which exclusive rights are being licensed or the scope of the
license conferred.258
Consequently, precisely which of the
copyright holder’s exclusive rights are being licensed or assigned,
and whether there are qualitative, durational, geographic, and/or
media restrictions limiting the grant of exclusive rights, are often
difficult to ascertain from the express terms of the parties’
agreement.259 In the face of a claim of a contractual right to
engage in a particular use of a copyrighted work, the court is
typically required to not only confirm the existence of the claimed
license, but also to define its scope.260
Tasini, Random House, and similar cases illustrate how some
of the license interpretation problems that arise in connection with
digital re-publication and other new technological uses for
copyrighted works are only partially the result of rapid
technological development. The question of precisely which
exclusive rights were encompassed within the parties’ license
agreements was one of the principal issues raised in Tasini.261
While the plaintiff freelance writers essentially conceded that their
agreements licensed the exclusive rights of reproduction and
distribution, they contended that the agreements did not license the
exclusive right of display, more specifically, the right to display
258

See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481,
485–88 (2d Cir. 1998); Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 152–54; Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta
Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2002); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 53, § 26.02 [B] (“[A] grant of the right to ‘reproduce the work in all
media now known or hereafter developed’ does not necessarily include the right to
distribute, exhibit, or perform the work (which are separate rights under copyright law) in
all future media.”).
259
See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 485–88; Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 152–54;
Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 621; Field, 89 F. Supp. at 614; cf. NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 53, § 10.14 [C] (discussing difficulties with the term “book form”).
260
See Nimmer, Licensing, supra note 238, at 119–22 (“A license is a contract. Its
subject matter is information and rights in information. The contract gives rights to a
licensee to use information or resources that the licensor controls or to which it controls
access. License agreements also often cover issues concerning the quality, availability,
and use of the information. . . . [T]he main function of the license centers on permissions
or agreements associated with the use of or access to informational assets, along with a
licensee’s promise not to exceed agreed limitations on use.”).
261
See Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 806–08.
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their works on a computer screen.262 Consequently, in part
because the parties’ agreements were not cast in terms of the
exclusive rights, the Tasini tribunals were confronted with a
bifurcated issue of statutory construction and license interpretation.
First, the courts had to decide whether the copyright holder’s
exclusive right of display extends to computer screen display, and
if so, whether the parties’ license agreements extended to the
display right, as it apparently extended to the rights of reproduction
and distribution.263
Inconsistencies between publishing trade licensing practices
and the express provisions of the copyright statute were at the very
heart of the controversy in Random House.264 Instead of casting
262

See id. at 808. Numerous courts have previously wrestled with the question of
whether computer screen display is conduct within the exclusive display right, with
differing results. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518
(9th Cir. 1993); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, *2–*5 (E.D. Va. 1996);
Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556–57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (“The concept of
display . . . covers ‘the projection of an image on a screen or other surface by any
method, the transmission of an image by electronic or other means, and the showing of an
image on a cathode ray tube, or similar viewing apparatus . . . .’ The display right
precludes unauthorized transmission of the display from one place to another, for
example, by a computer system.” (citations omitted)); State v. Perry, 697 N.E.2d 624,
628 (Ohio 1998) (“Posting software on a bulletin board where others can access and
download it is distribution. Unauthorized distribution is a use which is governed by the
copyright laws. Unauthorized posting may also be viewed as facilitating unauthorized
downloading or copying by a third party and as such is also a violation of the exclusive
right of reproduction under the copyright laws. Posting also implicates the display rights
of copyright owners.” (citations omitted)).
263
Both questions were implicated because even if the subject agreements do not license
the display right, plaintiffs must still demonstrate that the display right has been infringed
in order to establish copyright infringement. Once the publishers failed to assert their
license agreements in defense of their digital re-publications, however, they effectively
conceded that they had no authorization to engage in any of the exclusive rights, be it that
of display, or those of reproduction and distribution. Consequently, once the Court ruled
the § 201(c) privilege inapplicable, there was no question that the publishers had at least
infringed upon plaintiffs’ reproduction and distribution rights. “Satisfied that the
Publishers exercised rights § 106 initially assigns exclusively to the Author, we need
resolve no more on that score. Thus, we do not reach [the question as to whether] the
Databases publicly ‘display’ the Articles . . . .” N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,
498 n.8 (2001). Whether the publishers had also impinged upon the display right was
rendered surplusage—the case for copyright infringement had already been made.
264
Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 619–22 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
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their agreements in terms of the exclusive rights, the parties
executed written licenses that authorized the publisher to “to print,
publish and sell” the subject works and to do so “in book form.”265
Consequently, there were legitimate issues not only as to which
exclusive rights were licensed by the agreements, but also as to the
scope of the grants—i.e., the meaning of “in book form.”266
Thus, the perennial failure of the publishing trade to harmonize
its licensing terms and practices with the express provisions of the
copyright statute renders legal disputes and maneuverings such as
those that occurred in Tasini, Random House, and similar cases
inevitable.267 In a dispute over the right to engage in a new
technological use, both licensor and licensee genuinely may
believe that the right belongs to him or her. Moreover, because
publishing licenses typically make no reference to the enumerated
exclusive rights, which are the only uses of copyrighted material
that the copyright holder can legally control, the courts have little
guidance as to which of the copyright holder’s actual property
rights are the subject of the agreements.268 When a dispute arises
265

See id. at 614.
See id. at 620. The parties might also have litigated the issue as to whether the
display right is included in a license “to print, publish and sell.” Instead, the litigation
focused on deciphering the meaning of the trade term “in book form” and whether an
“ebook” is a work “in book form.” See id.
267
See Springer, supra note 236, at 352 (“While a written agreement can easily be
drafted using a fill-in-the-blanks form, recall that the freelance publishing industry has
been one based on traditions and handshakes.”); Vermylen, supra note 92, at 192 (“The
business of publishing books has historically been slow moving, driven more by
relationships and passion for the process than by bottom lines. Liberal arts majors,
literature students, and generalists of all sorts seek jobs in the industry in part for this
reason—books do not change and the business of making them changes only
begrudgingly.”).
268
For an excellent review of the various judicial approaches to new use disputes, see
Nakos, supra note 236, at 443–55, which discusses the predominant methods for
resolving such disputes, particularly the “preferred” and “strict” approaches. Under the
preferred approach, the new use is deemed to be within the scope of the license if it can
be reasonably construed to fall within the stated description of the explicitly licensed
activity. See id. at 444. Under the strict approach, only uses specifically provided for in
the express license terms are deemed within the scope of the license. See id. at 446.
Problems accompany either the preferred or strict approach . . . and arguments
have been made that each theory puts one party in an unfair position. One
problem lies in ascertaining the definition of the medium or mediums described
in the license, because a use may simply constitute an improvement on a
previous medium rather than an entirely new means of exploitation . . . . This
266
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in connection with a new technological use, courts are therefore
limited in determining the intent or reasonable expectations of the
parties, not only as a question of basic contract interpretation, but
as an issue of substantive copyright as well.269
B. Emphasizing Exclusive Rights in Drafting and Interpreting
Copyright Licenses
The problem of construing pre-existing license terms in light of
new technological applications for copyrighted works is to some
extent inescapable.270 No matter how carefully drafted, virtually
every license is vulnerable to ongoing technological development
and the consequential dilemma of determining which party has the
right to engage in a use or application that did not exist when the
license was executed.271
situation is especially problematic when applying the preferred approach
because the licensor’s carefully drafted, narrow, and unambiguous grant may
later become ambiguous in light of advanced technology.
Id. at 448–49 (footnotes omitted).
269
See id. at 435–36 (“[An important] issue [in publishing license disputes] is what uses
are covered by the rights transferred to the licensee when the license agreement does not
cover all possible contingencies, such as the invention of a new mode of presenting the
work or making the work available to the public. The problem is particularly perplexing
because the area is one where no controlling law is available to aid in placing the rights
with whom they belong. Courts have diverged in their attempts to resolve the situation
using basic contract interpretation principles as well as copyright policy; as a result, no
universally adopted rule has emerged.”); see generally Rosenzweig, supra note 255
(suggesting that courts should generally interpret contracts to grant rights to publishers to
exploit future technologies, because the publishers can best exploit the new
technologies).
270
See Nakos, supra note 236, at 434 (“[These] dispute[s] inevitably arise[] whenever a
new use for a certain work is developed or invented subsequent to the execution of the
license agreement. Licensees argue that the new use is contained in the definition of a
medium in the agreement. But licensors . . . counter that a new use could not be
contemplated by such an agreement. Because the use of the work did not exist at the time
the license agreement was drafted, courts must resolve the issue of to whom new uses
belong.”).
271
See id. at 436 (“[Disputes over the scope of the license have] repeatedly occurred
with the invention of popular new mediums. The resulting issues include the
following: . . . whether broadcasting rights include television when only radio existed at
the time of contracting, whether motion picture rights include rights to televise, whether
television and movie rights include videocassette distribution rights, and, currently,
whether the right to publish a book includes the right to make books on tape or transfer
the contents on-line.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Although it may be impossible to compose license terms that
will account for every new technological use, the problem can be
mitigated through the use of consistent terminology and rules of
interpretation in the drafting and judicial construction of copyright
licenses.272 As discussed in Part II, whatever the particular use to
which a copyrighted work is to be put, that use can only be
precluded, restricted, or for that matter, effectively licensed by the
copyright holder if it involves an exclusive right.273 Consequently,
even if a license unambiguously sanctions a specific use of
copyrighted material274 as a matter of the copyright law, the license
will be ambiguous as to the extent to which the copyright holder
can restrict or limit the activities of his or her licensee.275
Unless the grant of rights is described in terms of the exclusive
rights, the scope of the licensee’s ability to engage even in a
272

See Thornburg, supra note 2, at 255 (“[C]ontract law remains the sole mechanism to
bring both freelance authors and publishers to a common ground to create the exchange
of electronic rights for appropriate compensation. The traditional handshake agreements
between these parties have come to an abrupt end, with contract negotiations serving
society’s interest in promoting and encouraging freelance creations to enrich our cultural
needs.”).
273
See supra Part II.
274
This may include a license to publish a written work in digital format, if the license
is not equally specific with respect to the attendant exclusive rights—that is, explicitly
referencing the rights of reproduction and distribution (and possibly the right of display).
275
See, e.g., Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988)
(“Perhaps the primary reason why the words ‘exhibition by means of television’ in the
license cannot be construed as including the distribution of videocassettes for home
viewing is that VCRs for home use were not invented or known in 1969, when the license
was executed. . . . [T]he original licensee could not have bargained for, or paid for, the
rights associated with videocassette distribution. . . . [T]he license reserved to the grantor
‘all rights and uses in and to said musical composition, except those herein granted to the
licensee . . .’ This language operates to preclude uses not then known to, or contemplated
by the parties.” (citations omitted)); Rose, supra note 119, at 95 (“A critical issue for
Internet transmissions is whether they constitute ‘reproductions,’ ‘distributions,’ or both.
The original electronic file is typically not erased when a copy is transmitted. Because
the original from which the copy is generated remains intact, Internet communications
arguably infringe both reproduction and distribution rights. Indeed, for bulletin board or
website operators the query remains whether downloading from a bulletin board or
website is a ‘reproduction’ by the Internet user, or merely a ‘distribution’ by the
operator.” (footnotes omitted)); Vermylen, supra note 92, at 198 (“[E]ven in the age of
the e-book, it seems that the definition of ‘book’ is limited. As the [Random House]
court concluded, the rights to the content of a work itself are independent of the right to
publish it in a given form.”).
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specifically designated activity will be unclear, especially when
new technological uses are introduced. If the parties cast their
agreements in terms of the exclusive rights, however, when
confronted with a new technological use dispute, the parties and
the courts will have a concrete point of reference from which to
undertake the copyright allocation analysis: a comparison of the
new technological use with the exclusive rights expressly
referenced in the parties’ license agreement.
An “exclusive rights emphasis” would therefore require that
copyright licenses be expressed in terms of the enumerated
exclusive rights, and the presence or absence of such express terms
would be subject to uniform rules of construction. In this way, the
expression of a copyright license in terms of the exclusive rights
will provide greater certainty for the parties thereto and concrete
guidance for the courts when confronted with the problem of
allocating a new technological application for copyrighted
material.
Participants in the publishing trade could be encouraged to
adopt an exclusive rights emphasis in their drafting practices if
courts begin to interpret the inclusion or omission of exclusive
rights terms in a consistent manner.276 Both licensors and
licensees would soon realize that the use of exclusive rights
terminology would lead to predictable judicial construction of their
agreements. This would not only result in routine reference to the
exclusive rights in publishing licenses, but would also engender the
276

Reconstructing legal canons and mechanisms to address actual trade or market
conditions is by no means a new idea. See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, A Lawyering Approach
to Law and Development, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 31, 33–34 (2001) (“[A
lawyering] approach to law and development . . . relies not upon an arcane sociological
theory, but rather upon the lawyer’s consummate practical skill of problem-solving. The
lawyering approach involves professionalism, working for and with the client (including
active client participation in decision-making), and problem-solving. It takes as its
starting point the need to define what problems need to be addressed. Then a practical
analysis of each problem is undertaken with an aim of developing and implementing
practical solutions to those problems. . . . [T]he lawyering approach focuses . . . narrowly;
it assesses actual human needs based on actual conditions. . . . After needs are
determined, a lawyering approach requires developing strategies to address needs
revealed by the assessment, but without prejudging the utility of any particular structure
or set of laws. . . . Under the lawyering approach the reformer’s palette is not
monochromatic.” (footnotes omitted)).
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development of a more uniform “new technological use”
jurisprudence.
C. Applying an Exclusive Rights Emphasis to Tasini, Random
House, and Other “New Use” Disputes
An exclusive rights emphasis could have proved useful in
resolving some of the issues raised in Tasini and Random
House.277 For example, in Tasini specific exclusive rights were
referenced in some of the licenses at issue.278 With respect to such
agreements, where the new technological use or application
involves an exclusive right other than those expressly referenced in
the license agreement, the licensee would be hard pressed under an
exclusive rights emphasis to argue that he or she has a license to
engage in the additional exclusive right and the concomitant new
technological use. Thus, as in Tasini, where the written license
agreements expressly referenced the rights of reproduction and
distribution, the licensee has no exclusive display right and is also
precluded from engaging in activities that infringe upon that
right.279
In the situation in which the license agreement is expressed
both in terms of a specific application for the work and specific
exclusive rights, the reference to exclusive rights will control. For
example, in Random House, the license agreement authorized
reproduction and distribution of the subject works “in book
form.”280 Under an exclusive rights emphasis, the license does not
grant any right exclusive rights beyond reproduction and
277

In Greenberg, National Geographic relinquished all contractual rights in the
copyrighted photograph prior to the events that gave rise to the litigation, hence the
problem of interpreting a license was not an issue in that case. See Greenberg v. Nat’l
Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001).
278
See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d and
remanded, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
279
Consequently, had the Supreme Court reached the issue in connection with such
license agreements, under an exclusive rights approach the Court would have only to
determine whether computer screen display is an activity subsumed within the copyright
holder’s exclusive display right. If so, the publishing licensees could not engage in
unauthorized digital re-publication without infringing upon the contributory author’s
exclusive rights.
280
See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
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distribution. Thus, if computer screen display is eventually
determined by the courts to be an activity within the exclusive
display right, then the production of e-books is beyond the scope of
the license. The license only grants the exclusive rights to
reproduce and distribute the work “in book form,” and because an
e-book would involve the right of display, an e-book is essentially
“a form of book” outside the scope of the license.
Where the license agreement makes no reference to any
exclusive rights whatsoever, an exclusive rights emphasis would
require that assessment of the scope of the license begin with a
determination of which of the enumerated exclusive rights are
absolutely essential to any method for undertaking the application
or activity described in the parties’ agreement.281 In as much as
the parties obviously intended that the licensee engage in the
specified activity, it is only reasonable to construe the license to
permit the licensee to engage in those exclusive rights that are
necessary to undertaking that activity.282 Otherwise, the licensee
could not engage in the licensed activity under any circumstances,
and the license would be rendered a nullity.283
On the other hand, there may also be alternative methods
available for engaging in the activity described in the license,
whether existing as of the time of the parties’ contracting or
developed subsequently during the license term. To the extent that
such alternative methods involve “non-essential” exclusive
281

For example, different electronic publication methods or products can involve
different exclusive rights. If a specifically designated electronic use can be undertaken
through a method or methods which involve only certain exclusive rights and without
involving other exclusive rights, the court should construe the electronic use license to
encompass only the narrowest range of exclusive rights—that is, only those exclusive
rights essential to every method for engaging in the specified electronic activity.
282
See, e.g., Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 621; Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F.
Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
283
This rule would also be of use in a variation of the situation in which the license has
been expressed in terms of a particular kind of use and also specific exclusive rights, such
as a license to reproduce and distribute a written work in digital media. Obviously the
rights of reproduction and distribution have been licensed, but what happens if the courts
eventually determine that computer screen display encroaches upon the exclusive display
right? In as much as computer screen display is essential to all methods of digital media
use, the license would be construed to extend to the display right, at least to the extent
necessary to avoid nullification of the parties’ agreement.
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rights—that is, exclusive rights that must be exercised in
conjunction with some, but not all methods for undertaking the
licensed activity—such non-essential exclusive rights/alternative
methods are beyond the scope of the license.284 Because the
parties failed to express their license agreement in terms of the
exclusive rights, and because a license of any of the exclusive
rights must be express in order to be effective, the license should
be narrowly construed to extend to only those exclusive rights
necessary to avoid the complete nullification of the parties’
agreement. The lack of an express reference to the non-essential
exclusive rights should therefore be construed as a reservation of
such rights, as well as of any concomitant new technological uses,
on the part of the copyright holder.285

284

See Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1988); Nimmer,
Licensing, supra note 238, at 127 (“One can license any of the [exclusive] rights, while
retaining control of the others. One can license or transfer such rights on an exclusive or
a non-exclusive basis. Similarly, one can subdivide any of the rights through limitations
in a license. . . . [T]he important point is that a contract that grants one right (or part of it)
does not imply that any other right is granted under the license. Indeed, in the absence of
other indicia of a broader agreement, a license conveys only what was expressly granted
or what can reasonably be inferred from that express grant. There is no assumption that a
transferor (rights owner) grants all rights except those it expressly withholds.” (footnotes
omitted)).
285
See Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 239, at 462 (“[A]lthough it is
traditional to view copyright doctrine as a battle between the interests of copyright
owners . . . and copyright users, in practice, those interests are remarkably congruent.
Both sellers and buyers have a considerable stake in the maintenance of an orderly
market with plentiful supplies of new works at reasonable prices.”); Nakos, supra note
234, at 445–46 (“[I]f a technology did not exist when a licensing agreement was made,
how can a court construe the agreement to have granted any rights in that technology . . .?
While it strains reason to allow a court to randomly assign a rule in situations where
certain uses, whether existing or new, are not addressed by the parties to the agreement,
the line is crossed when uses not specifically reserved to the grantor are [construed as
having been] transferred to the grantee.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, describing the license
in terms of specific uses for a work as opposed to specific exclusive rights increases
uncertainty and the possibility of a windfall to one side. The right to engage in
subsequently developed methods for undertaking the specifically licensed activity would
belong to the licensee, so long as such methods do not require engagement in any
additional, i.e., “non-essential” exclusive rights. On the other hand, new technological
uses that require any non-essential exclusive rights would be deemed as reserved to the
copyright holder.
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D. The Presumption of “Technological Neutrality”
One final new technological use canon of construction that
would promote the expression of copyright license agreements in
terms of the exclusive rights is a presumption of “technological
neutrality.” Such a presumption would mandate that the express
license of an exclusive right be construed to extend to all
technological means available to engage in that right, including
those methods not in existence when the parties entered into their
agreement, but have come into existence during the license term.
In granting a license of an exclusive right, if the copyright
holder wishes to limit the grant to specific or presently existing
methods of engagement, he or she can state such restriction
explicitly in the agreement.286 This can be easily accomplished by
expressly limiting the license to methods currently in existence or
through the use of some other appropriate reservation of rights
language.287

286

See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 487
(2d Cir. 1998) (“[The words of the] license are more reasonably read to include than to
exclude a motion picture distributed in video format . . . . [W]e conclude that the burden
fell on [the copyright holder] to exclude new markets arising from subsequently
developed motion picture technology, [and] to insert such language of limitation in the
license, rather than on [the licensee] to add language that reiterated what the license
already stated.”); Vermylen, supra note 92, at 194–95 (“Publishing contracts also
traditionally contain a provision dealing with the license of electronic rights or rights in
the work derived from ‘technologies not yet known’ or ‘other media.’ . . . As these
technologies become ‘known’ rather than ‘not yet known’ and prove profitable, authors
begin to reserve the right to license these rights in their works. This reservation typically
takes the form of either an express clause in the contract or a clause limiting the grant of
rights to only those traditional print forms listed in the contract . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
287
See Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 487–88 (“[S]ignificant jurisprudential and policy
considerations confirm . . . our view [that construing a general grant of rights to include
new use technologies] is more consistent with the law of contract than the view that
would exclude new technologies even when they reasonably fall within the description of
what is licensed. Although contract interpretation normally requires inquiry into the
intent of the contracting parties, intent is not likely to be helpful when the subject of the
inquiry is something the parties were not thinking about.”); see also Michael R. Fuller,
Hollywood Goes Interactive: Licensing Problems Associated with Re-Purposing Motion
Pictures into Interactive Multimedia Videogames, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 599, 612 (1995)
(“If the words . . . are broad enough to cover the new use, it seems fairer that the burden
of framing and negotiating an exception should fall on the grantor . . . .”). But see Nakos,
supra note 236, at 455–57 (arguing in favor of a strict interpretation approach, such that
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Placing upon the copyright holder the responsibility of
reserving a technological limitation on the express license of an
exclusive right is an approach consistent with the provisions of the
Copyright Act as well as copyright public policy.288 Moreover, a
presumption in favor of technological neutrality is not a bias in
favor of publishing licensees. It merely preserves the parties’
actual bargain, or perhaps more accurately, it resolves issues the
parties failed to address in a manner consistent with traditional
contract canons and copyright policy objectives.289
We acknowledge that a result which deprives the authorlicensor of participation in the profits of new unforeseen
channels of distribution is not an altogether happy solution.
Nonetheless, we think it more fair and sensible than a result
that would deprive a contracting party of the rights
reasonably found in the terms of the contract it negotiates.
This issue is too often, and improperly, framed as one of
favoritism as between licensors and licensees. Because
licensors are often authors—whose creativity the copyright
laws intend to nurture—and are often impecunious, while
licensees are often large business organizations, there is
sometimes a tendency in copyright scholarship and
adjudication to seek solutions that favor licensors over
licensees. . . .

any use not expressly provided for in the license would be considered reserved by the
licensor).
288
Copyright protection is afforded to appropriate works upon fixation in any medium,
“now known or later developed.” 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (2003); see Boosey & Hawkes, 145
F.3d at 488 n.4 (“[A]n approach to new-use problems that tilts against licensees gives rise
to antiprogressive incentives. [For example, m]otion picture producers would be
reluctant to explore and utilize innovative technologies for the exhibition of movies if the
consequence would be that they would lose the right to exhibit pictures containing
licensed works.”).
289
See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 152–55 (2d Cir. 1968)
(“In the end, decision must turn . . . on a choice between two basic approaches [to dealing
with new technological uses] more than on an attempt to distill decisive meaning out of
language that very likely had none.” (citation omitted)); NBC v. Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[Copyright] ownership is itself
dependent on the contractual terms [between the parties]; it cannot be settled without
reference to those terms.”).
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In our view, new-use analysis should rely on neutral
principals of contract interpretation rather than solicitude
for either party. . . . If the contract is more reasonably read
to convey one meaning, the party benefitted [sic] by that
reading should be able to rely upon it. . . . This principle
favors neither licensors nor licensees. It follows simply
from the words of the contract.290
A presumption of technological neutrality equally favors and
disfavors both licensor and licensee.291 As described above, the
presumption would enable licensees to engage in subsequently
developed methods for undertaking expressly licensed exclusive
rights. On the other hand, a new technological use that
incorporates exclusive rights other than those referenced in the
agreement, for example, a new method of reproduction that also
utilizes the right of distribution, would be deemed beyond the
scope of the license, if only the right of reproduction is referenced
in the license.292
While the new technological use of digital re-publication
presents a novel challenge to the traditional copyright framework,
it also provides an opportunity to address the nettlesome
inconsistencies between the business of copyright licensing and the

290

Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d at 487; see also Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books
LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).
291
See Nakos, supra note 236, at 443 n.49 (“At the heart of the controversy over the
rights to exploit a work in a new medium is the potential revenue that this medium may
generate to whomever possesses those rights. When a new use surfaces, it does not alter
the original rights conveyed by the contract. Instead, a case typically ‘involves
circumstances so changed that the deal looks less attractive now than when struck.’”
(quoting Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 538 F. Supp. 211, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1982))).
292
See Nakos, supra note 236, at 434 (“In the case of a licensing agreement that fails to
place the rights to newly developed means of exploitation of the licensed work, any
ambiguity should be construed in favor of the licensor: a strict approach to interpreting
copyright licensing agreements, reserving all uses not expressly granted to the licensor, is
the best approach.”). While resolving any ambiguity in favor of the licensor goes too far,
the basic argument that copyrights must be expressly transferred is of course sound.
However, when a copyright owner expressly licenses an exclusive right and does so
without any explicit reservation or restriction, construing the license to include all
methods for engaging in that right that are (or become) available during the license term
merely implements the express provisions of the license, as well as copyright policy.
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mandates of the copyright law.293 Other than when the entire
copyright is being assigned, traditional publishing boilerplate has
proven an inadequate means by which to authorize new and
sometimes even traditional uses of copyrighted material, or to
license any exclusive rights essential or incidental to such
activities.294 By expressing the license in terms of the exclusive
rights, the parties make clear which of the copyright holder’s
actual property rights are the subject of the their agreement, and
also provide a roadmap for the resolution of any disputes that
might arise in connection with the development of new
technological application relevant to their agreement.295

293

See Jamar, supra note 276, at 41–44 (“The core attributes of a lawyering approach
are: (1) professionalism, (2) client-centeredness, and (3) problem-solving. . . . When the
three core elements of the lawyering approach are considered together, one is forced into
a process-oriented approach . . . . Client centeredness and client involvement in the
problem-solving process ensure an emphasis on inclusion and process rather than
exclusion and fiat.” (footnotes omitted)).
294
See J. Michael Huget & Sarah K. Fisher, Put It in Writing: The Extent of Rights
Acquired on a Copyrightable Work Should Be Agreed upon Ahead of Time, 80 MICH. B.J.
50, 51 (Nov. 2001) (“The difficulty that arose in Tasini is that the publishers did not
obtain copyright ownership for the articles at issue; as a result, they merely had a license
to publish the articles in their publications. Given that the license did not address the
issue of electronic databases, the publishers were at the mercy of judicial
interpretation. . . . Thus, the lesson from Tasini is simple . . . : it is imperative for any
person or company hiring an independent contractor to create a copyrightable work to
agree in writing, before the work is begun, on the extent of the rights to be acquired from
the independent contractor. The lack of a written agreement will ensure that the
independent contractor will retain the copyright ownership, along with the right to license
and further exploit the work.”).
295
See NBC, 848 F.2d at 1293 (“[C]opyrights, or any of their individual constituent
parts, are freely alienable. . . . The Copyright Act aids commercial exploitation of
copyrights by allowing the sale of particular rights—such as movie rights or rights to
perform a popular song—or of the entire bundle. The intent of the parties, as expressed
in their contracting, therefore can determine who enjoys copyright protection for certain
rights. . . . Only reference to the parties’ intent can indicate the relevant owner. The goals
of the alienability and divisibility of copyrights would, of course, be subverted if private
contracts were not enforced properly.” (citations omitted)); see also Boosey & Hawkes,
145 F.3d at 484–91; Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 154–55 (2d
Cir. 1968); Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 617–22; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
53, § 26.02[C][1]–[2]; Ginsburg, supra note 255, at 954–73; Rosenzweig, supra note
255, at 908–18.
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CONCLUSION
The copyright issues presented by digital re-publication affect
virtually every existing printed work not in the public domain.
Whether regarded as an entirely sui generis activity or a
combination of existing exclusive rights, digital re-publication is
fast becoming the principal means for archiving printed works.
The advent of digital re-publication not only eliminates the need
for possession of individual copies of specific works, but facilitates
their dissemination to larger audiences than ever.
As Tasini and its progeny demonstrate, however, relatively few
existing works have been published pursuant to agreements that
encompass their use in electronic media. Consequently, the legal
mechanisms through which digital re-publication is accomplished
will continue to be a source of conflict in the publishing industry.
Publishers are likely to continue to utilize their superior bargaining
leverage to secure digital re-publication rights without paying
additional compensation to most copyright holders.296 For their
part, authors and authors’ organizations will work to devise
accessible writer compensation mechanisms, whereby cooperative
publishers might easily pay digital re-publication royalties to
copyright owners. Various writers’ groups have already organized
“copyright clearinghouses” to collect and distribute digital republication royalties, borrowing from methods employed in the
recording industry for decades.297

296

See Springer, supra note 236, at 349 (“With the risk of liability ‘too great to allow
any other course of action,’ The Times has engaged in an on-going process of removing
those freelance articles with unsecured rights from electronic archives. At the same time,
The Times has set up a process for allowing freelance authors to allow their submissions
to remain in the electronic archives if they should so desire.”).
297
See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 2, at 253 (“In addition to individual contracts
between freelance authors and publishers, two payment systems are currently employed
to compensate authors directly for the use of their work in electronic media. ‘The
Authors Registry is a non-profit organization formed to help expedite the flow of royalty
payments and small re-use fees from publisher to author,’ and includes over 100 literary
agencies and represents 50,000 writers.
In addition, the Publication Rights
Clearinghouse, which was formed by the National Writers Union, ‘pays a copyright fee
of 30% of its delivery price,’ deducting a twenty percent administration cost for union
members. The clearinghouse mostly secures royalties in the fields of full-text databases,
Web sites, and other similar electronic media.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Albanese,
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In those cases in which publishers and authors remain at a
digital re-publication impasse, however, the fair use doctrine
provides an appropriate method for balancing the competing
interests in a socially responsible manner. Indeed, the availability
and application of the fair use doctrine may well foster the
development of consensual mechanisms for digital re-publication.
Given that the question of fair use is extremely fact sensitive, both
publishers and authors alike have a powerful incentive to work
toward non-judicial resolutions of their digital re-publication
disputes.298
Moreover, many a digital re-publication standoff will present
attractive broker/mediator opportunities for third-party electronic
re-publishers. Entities such as NEXIS can not only bring
additional resources to the negotiation table, but may also have the
most to gain from the expeditious resolution of digital republication conflicts.299
Finally, with respect to both new and existing works, the
widespread adoption of an exclusive rights emphasis in copyright
licensing would aid in facilitating digital re-publication as well as
other new technological uses for copyrighted works. The
consistent demonstration of a judicial preference for an exclusive
rights construction/allocation approach to new technological use
disputes would assist authors and publishers in evaluating their
respective positions under existing publishing contracts, and also
encourage participants in the publishing trade to improve and
conform current licensing practices. This would diminish the
supra note 244, at 14; Reed, supra note 56, at 1106, 1110–11; Soares, supra note 56,
¶¶ 24–25.
298
See, e.g., Anderson & Brown, supra note 111, at 144 (“Many who have looked at the
relationship between copyright protection and the fair use defense have concluded that
finding a fair use is, at best, a matter of balancing hard-to-define equitable considerations,
or at worst, a matter of luck. Additionally, for those of the orthodox school, obtaining a
fair use exception in court is simply a matter of marshalling more emotionally appealing
equities for fair use than the creator of the work can offer against fair use. Most of the
copyright commentators have argued that the fair use case law is largely unprincipled and
unpredictable.” (footnotes omitted)).
299
For example, in a typical digital re-publication dispute, electronic publishers such as
NEXIS could offer to negotiate independent arrangements with writers’ groups, while
presenting lucrative re-publication opportunities to both sides that could only be obtained
through author/publisher cooperation.
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number and complexity of such disputes, as well as the need for
judicial intervention in such matters. Such progress will assure
widespread digital re-publication and increased digital
dissemination of printed copyrighted works, all to the greater
public good.

